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The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty Government 
Employees 
Mary-Rose Papandrea 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Until recently, Andrew Shirvell was an assistant attorney general 
in Michigan. This past fall, he created a blog attacking the openly 
gay president of the University of Michigan student body as a 
“racist” and “liar” who was promoting “a radical homosexual 
agenda.”1 Initially, Michigan Attorney General Michael Cox—
Shirvell’s boss—condemned Shirvell’s anti-homosexual rantings but 
resisted calls for Shirvell’s firing, citing Shirvell’s First Amendment 
right to say what he wants while he is off duty.2 In a statement, 
General Cox remarked: “Mr. Shirvell’s personal opinions are his and 
his alone and do not reflect the views of the Michigan Department 
of Attorney General. But his immaturity and lack of judgment 
outside the office are clear.”3 General Cox later fired Shirvell, citing 
an investigation that had revealed that Shirvell had “repeatedly 
violated office policies, engaged in borderline stalking behavior and 
inappropriately used state resources” to engage in his attack during 
work hours.4  
Not all government employers would have waited so long to 
punish an employee for this sort of offensive off-duty speech. In 
addition, many lower courts have ruled against government 
 
  Associate Professor, Boston College Law School. I would like to thank the 
participants attending BYU Law School’s symposium on the “Emerging Complexities of the 
Government Speech Doctrine” for their thoughtful comments and suggestions on this Article 
as well as Noah Hampson for invaluable research assistance. A summer research grant from the 
Boston College Law School Fund helped make this project possible. 
 1. Laura Berman, Assistant AG Takes Leave Amid Gay-Bashing Controversy, DETROIT 
NEWS, Oct. 2, 2010, available at http://www.detnews.com/article/20101001/METRO/ 
10010422/Assistant-AG-takes-leave-amid-gay-bashing-controversy. 
 2.  Id. 
 3. Michael Winter, Michigan Law Official Fired for Harassing Gay Student Leader, 
USA TODAY (Nov. 8, 2010, 6:21 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ 
ondeadline/post/2010/11/michigan-law-official-fired-for-harassing-gay-student-leader/1. 
 4. Id. 
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employees in similar cases.5 Although General Cox told Anderson 
Cooper of CNN that the Supreme Court has held that a government 
employee enjoys broad First Amendment protection for speech that 
does not undermine his ability to do his job,6 the Court’s 
jurisprudence is not so clear. 
The Supreme Court’s most recent public-employee speech case, 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, may have served only to muddy the waters by 
embracing the distinction between a government employee acting as 
“an employee” and one acting “as a citizen.”7 The Court had 
suggested this sort of binary approach to public-employee cases 
before,8 but it was not until Garcetti that the Court endorsed this 
approach as a guiding principle. When an employee is acting as “an 
employee,” he enjoys no First Amendment protection for his speech. 
To bolster this conclusion, the Court invoked the government 
 
 5.  See, e.g., Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting First 
Amendment claim brought by police officer who maintained sexually explicit website that 
featured himself and his wife); Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2006) (dismissing 
First Amendment claim brought by police and fire officers who were terminated after they 
participated in a parade float that mocked stereotypes of African-Americans); Meltzer v. Bd. of 
Educ., 336 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting First Amendment claim brought by teacher 
who was fired for his membership in NAMBLA); Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 
2002) (dismissing First Amendment claim brought by member of police force who 
anonymously sent racist hate mail to nonprofit organizations that had solicited him for 
donations); Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that suspension of police 
officer who wore racially offensive Halloween costume to party at Fraternal Order of Police 
Lodge did not violate First Amendment); Easton v. Harsha, 505 F. Supp. 2d 948 (D. Kan. 
2007) (rejecting First Amendment claim brought by police officer who wrote racially offensive 
emails to author of newspaper column); Pereira v. Comm’r of Soc. Servs., 733 N.E.2d 112 
(Mass. 2000) (rejecting First Amendment claim brought by employee who told racially 
offensive joke at retirement dinner); Karins v. City of Atlantic City, 706 A.2d 706 (N.J. 1998) 
(striking down First Amendment claim brought by off-duty firefighter who made racial epithet 
to police officer during traffic stop).  
 6. Martina Steward & Ed Payne, Michigan Attorney General Defends Employee’s Right 
to Blog, ANDERSON COOPER 360 (Oct. 1, 2010, 5:15 AM), http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/ 
2010/09/30/michigan-attorney-general-defends-employees-right-to-blog/. 
 7. 547 U.S. 410, 418–19 (2006). 
 8.  See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 456 (1995) 
(striking down federal law banning government employees from receiving compensation for 
their off-duty expressive activities because the employees “seek compensation . . . in their 
capacity as citizens, not public employees”); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (holding 
that courts generally should not interfere with personnel decisions “when a public employee 
speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon 
matters only of personal interest”); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) 
(noting the need to strike “a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees”). 
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speech doctrine, arguing that when an employee speaks pursuant to 
his job duties, the government employer “has commissioned or 
created” that speech and can restrict it without violating the First 
Amendment.9 This reference to the government speech doctrine 
raises the question of whether there are other circumstances under 
which the government can control the speech of its employees in 
order to protect its own ability to communicate.  
Although Garcetti did not involve off-duty speech, it noted that 
when an employee is not speaking as part of his job duties but 
instead is speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, he may 
be subject to “only those speech restrictions that are necessary for 
[his] employer[] to operate efficiently and effectively.”10 This 
statement is a summary of the Connick/Pickering framework. Under 
this framework, a public employee’s speech is not entitled to any 
First Amendment protection unless it is determined, as a threshold 
matter, that the speech involves a matter of public concern, and, 
even if that requirement is satisfied, the speech is protected only if 
the value of the speech outweighs the government employer’s 
interests in restricting or punishing it. Although this is the general 
framework for public-employee speech cases, it is hardly clear from 
the Court’s own jurisprudence that this is the framework that 
applies—or should apply—in cases involving off-duty expression, 
especially when the expression is not work related.  
In determining what sort of First Amendment rights government 
employees should enjoy when they are off duty, the distinction 
between speech “as an employee” and speech “as a citizen” is 
ultimately not as useful. Employees do not stop being citizens when 
they are at work; likewise, they do not stop being employees when 
they are not. Furthermore, it does not help to compare off-duty 
government employees to off-duty non-government employees. 
Outside of the government context, private employers can discipline 
their employees for their off-duty expression with impunity, absent a 
state-statutory or constitutional requirement to the contrary. In that 
way, employees for private employers are always employees in terms 
of the precariousness of their speech rights. They enjoy the robust 
speech rights of citizens only vis-à-vis the government. The problem 
is that for public employees their employer is the government.  
 
 9. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22. 
 10. Id. at 419. 
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This Article contends that the Connick/Pickering framework 
should not apply in cases involving off-duty, non-work-related 
government-employee speech. Connick’s threshold public-concern 
inquiry is not appropriately tailored to address a government 
employer’s legitimate interests in controlling the expressive activities 
of its employees in such circumstances. In addition, Pickering’s 
balancing test, which weighs the value of the employee’s speech 
against the government-employer’s interest in restricting it, fails to 
limit government control over its employee’s speech activities 
sufficiently.  
Instead, this Article argues that off-duty, non-work-related 
speech by government employees should be entitled to presumptive 
protection under the First Amendment. Recognizing that it is never 
entirely possible to separate the citizen from the employee, or vice 
versa, this Article asserts that a government employer can overcome 
this presumption by showing that particular reasons specifically 
related to the employment relationship warrant controlling employee 
expression. Such reasons include a showing that the employee is 
reasonably regarded as speaking for the employer and interferes with 
a clearly articulated message of his government employer (an 
extension of the government speech doctrine), or that the speech 
indicates that the employee is unfit to perform the duties of his 
position.11 
 
 11. Commentators have made a variety of suggestions for reforming the law governing 
the First Amendment rights of off-duty public employees. See, e.g., Stephen Allred, From 
Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 
43 (1988); Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due Process Solution to a 
First Amendment Problem, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 168–72 (arguing that Due Process clause 
might provide alternative basis for aggrieved employees disciplined for their speech made 
pursuant to their job duties; noting that extending this proposed Due Process model to 
disputes involving speech that is not related to employment is “tantalizing” but requires more 
study); Cythnia Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First 
Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990) (criticizing threshold public concern 
inquiry and suggesting a return to Pickering); Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public 
Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1010 (2005) (arguing for “full First Amendment 
protection to employee speech that occurs off the job and is directed” to the public and no 
First Amendment protection for speech occurring at work or that is directed to a workplace 
audience); Pengtian Ma, Public Employee Speech and Public Concern: A Critique of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Threshold Approach to Public Employee Speech Cases, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
121 (1996) (advocating for the abandonment of Connick’s threshold public concern inquiry in 
favor of test balancing the various interests at stake); Toni Massaro, Significant Silences: 
Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1987); Lawrence 
Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 33, 64–65 (2008) (arguing that government employers should have broad managerial 
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Part II of this Article discusses the Supreme Court’s convoluted 
jurisprudence regarding the free speech rights of government 
employees. Part III illustrates how the lower courts have struggled to 
make sense of the Supreme Court’s decisions as applied to off-duty 
speech cases, particularly the application of the threshold public-
concern requirement and the Pickering balancing test. Part IV then 
argues that the off-duty, non-work-related expressive activities of 
public employees should be given presumptive protection under the 
First Amendment and that the government employer should be 
permitted to overcome the presumption only in certain limited 
circumstances. 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
In the last fifty years, public employees12 have seen their free 
speech rights ebb and flow. For the first half of the twentieth 
century, the Supreme Court made clear that the First Amendment 
placed no restraints on the ability of government employers to 
discharge or otherwise discipline their employees for their expressive 
activities.13 Oliver Wendell Holmes, while serving on the Supreme 
 
authority to restrict the off-duty speech of their employees that might undermine their on-duty 
effectiveness); D. Gordon Smith, Beyond “Public Concern”: New Free Speech Standards for 
Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 266 (1990) (arguing that any speech made outside 
of the workplace that “concerns matters unrelated to workplace personnel or policies or 
unrelated to political issues directly affecting the employee’s working relationships” should be 
absolutely immune from government regulation). Few articles have considered the 
ramifications of applying the government speech doctrine to off-duty public employees. See 
Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of its Workers’ 
Speech to Protect its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1 (2009); Helen Norton, Government 
Workers and Government Speech, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 75 (2008). Professor Norton’s 
excellent articles focus exclusively on the government speech issue and do not take on the 
Pickering/Connick framework or discuss any other permissible justifications government 
employers might give to defeat their employees’ First Amendment claims.  
 12. This Article uses the terms “public employee” and “government employee” 
interchangeably to refer to non-civil-service employees at the federal, state, and local levels. 
Civil servants are hired based on competitive examinations and are subject to special speech 
restrictions and entitled to certain statutory rights that are beyond the scope of this Article. 
The First Amendment does not restrict the ability of private employers to discipline their 
employees for their expressive activities, although some states have constitutional provisions or 
statutes that do.  
 13. See, e.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (upholding state law 
banning members of subversive groups from employment in the public schools, reasoning that 
persons “have no right to work for the State in the school system on their own terms”) 
overruled in part by Keyshian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Garner 
v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 720 (1951) (upholding loyalty oath because the inquiry 
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Judicial Court of Massachusetts, summed up this view when he 
famously proclaimed, “The petitioner may have a constitutional right 
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman.”14 Government employers enjoyed the same absolute 
right private employers did to discipline their employees for their 
expressive activities, absent contractual or state constitutional or 
statutory protections providing to the contrary. Government 
employers could limit their employees’ speech no matter where the 
employees spoke or what they said. 
The Supreme Court began to revise its position in the 1950s and 
1960s when it held that the government could not require 
employees to swear loyalty oaths and reveal the groups with which 
they were associated.15 The Court recognized that public employees 
were still citizens entitled to contribute to the public debate and that 
their government employers were still part of the government subject 
to constitutional constraints. In Pickering v. Board of Education, the 
Court held that the First Amendment protects the expressive 
activities of government employees as long as the government’s 
interest in suppression does not outweigh the employee’s interest in 
free speech.16 Since Pickering, however, the Court has cut back 
dramatically on the free speech rights of public employees, especially 
with its most recent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos.17 But rather than 
eliminate public-employee speech rights entirely, the Court has 
created a confusing, multi-step inquiry. This framework has left the 
expressive rights of “off-duty” government employees engaging in 
non-work-related expressive activities particularly unclear.  
 
is relevant to determining an employee’s “fitness and suitability for the public service”); United 
Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (upholding the Hatch Act’s ban on the political 
activities of federal civil-service employees). 
 14. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
 15. See, e.g., Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605–06 (1967) (noting that the Court has rejected 
the theory that public employment can be subject to any conditions the government wants); 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404–05 (1963) (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 
183, 191–92 (1952); Am. Comm. Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 390 (1950); Hannegan v. 
Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 155–56 (1946)) (“It is too late in the day to doubt that the 
liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions 
upon a benefit or privilege.”). 
 16.  391 U.S. 563, 563–64 (1968). 
 17.  547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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A. Pickering v. Board of Education: A Balance of Interests 
In its landmark 1968 decision in Pickering v. Board of Education, 
the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment provides some 
protection for the free speech rights of public employees.18 At issue 
in the case was a school teacher’s letter to the editor criticizing the 
school board’s funding-allocation decisions. The teacher had been 
terminated on the grounds that his letter was “detrimental to the 
efficient operation and administration of the schools of the 
district.”19 In a striking departure from the Holmesian view that had 
dominated for decades, the Court held that the teacher’s dismissal 
violated the First Amendment.20 
Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall noted that because “free 
and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the 
electorate,” and because government employees are often “most 
likely to have informed and definite opinions” on matters of public 
concern, “it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such 
questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”21 At the same time, 
the Court recognized that the government must have some leeway 
to restrict the expression of its employees in ways that would be 
plainly unconstitutional with respect to the general public.22 To 
reconcile these competing interests, the Court set up a balancing test 
for determining whether the employee’s constitutional rights had 
been violated. This test requires a “balance between the interests of 
the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting 
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees.”23 
In applying the balancing test to the case at hand, the Court 
noted that the teacher’s letter involved a matter of public concern, 
was directed to the general public, and did not affect the teacher’s 
proper performance of his duties.24 The Court rejected the school 
 
 18. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569–70. 
 19. Id. at 564–65. 
 20. Id. at 564. 
 21. Id. at 571–72.  
 22. See id. at 568 (holding that the government’s interest in regulating the speech of its 
employees “differ[s] significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the 
speech of the citizenry in general”). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 571–73.  
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board’s argument that employees could be disciplined based on the 
inherently disruptive nature of truthful statements that are critical of 
the government agency.25 Because there was no evidence that the 
false statements in the letter undermined Pickering’s ability to 
perform his job or interfered with the operation of the schools, the 
Court also held that the statements were not sanctionable simply 
because they were false.26 The Court concluded that the school 
board could not punish Pickering because the school had no greater 
interest in stifling his letter than it would have in stifling similar 
criticism made by a member of the general public, even though the 
letter was critical of his superiors, especially given that in this case 
“the fact of employment is only tangentially and insubstantially 
involved in the subject matter of the public communication made by 
a teacher.”27  
The Court elaborated on the Pickering balancing test in two 
subsequent cases. In Mt. Healthy City School District Board of 
Education v. Doyle, the Court made clear that the employee had the 
burden to prove that he was engaged in constitutionally protected 
expressive activities and that these activities were a motivating factor 
in the decision to discipline.28 If the employee can meet these two 
burdens, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show that it 
would have disciplined the employee regardless of her speech.29 In 
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, the Court held 
that an employee does not lose First Amendment protection for her 
speech simply because she decides to speak privately rather than 
publicly.30 In Givhan, a teacher had privately discussed her concerns 
about discriminatory practices at her school. The Court noted that 
although speech made privately does not automatically lose 
constitutional protection, “additional factors” might come into play 
on the employer’s side of the Pickering balance in such cases, where 
the time, place, and manner of the speech may pose a threat to the 
institutional efficiency of the agency.31 The Court’s decision in 
 
 25. Id. at 570. 
 26. Id. at 572–73. 
 27. Id. at 573–74. 
 28. 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 
429 U.S. 252, 270–71 (1977)). 
 29. Id. at 287. 
 30. 439 U.S. 410, 414–16 (1979). 
 31. Id. at 415 n.4. 
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Givhan does not seem to be based on the need to protect an 
employee’s contributions to public debate, which the Court 
suggested as a rationale for protecting employee speech in Pickering, 
but instead on the value of requiring the government employer to 
tolerate some internal dissenting speech on matters of public 
concern. 
B. Connick v. Myers and Rankin v. McPherson: Establishing a 
Threshold “Public Concern” Requirement and Fine-Tuning the 
Pickering Balancing Test 
In Connick v. Myers, the Court scaled back the protections it 
offered public employees in Pickering by holding that government 
employers should be given “wide latitude” to restrict employee 
speech that does not relate to a matter of public concern.32 The 
Court held that “absent the most unusual circumstances,” federal 
courts should not get involved in personnel decisions based on 
speech made by “an employee upon matters only of personal 
interest.”33 Although the Court recognized that speech on private 
matters did not fall outside of the First Amendment, it justified its 
distinction between matters of public and private concern on the 
ground that it is necessary only to protect the “fundamental rights” 
of government employees and not to give them immunity for 
grievances that non-government employees do not enjoy.34  
After Connick, a court must first determine as a threshold matter 
whether the challenged expression is a matter of public concern, 
before even applying the Pickering balance test. Connick limited the 
protections Pickering offered because, even though Pickering itself 
involved speech on a matter of public concern, that case simply 
considered the high-value nature of that expression as just one factor 
to consider in the balance of interests, and not as a threshold 
requirement. Connick also offers courts an opportunity to avoid the 
difficulties of applying the Pickering balancing test by permitting 
them to throw out a significant number of claims at the outset.35 
 
 32. 461 U.S. 138, 146–47 (1983). 
 33. Id. at 147. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Allred, supra note 11, at 76–77 (“[B]y affording the courts the opportunity to 
decide close cases on the first prong of the test—that is, to rule as a matter of law that the 
matter is not one of public concern—the harder question of proper resolution of interests may 
be avoided.”). 
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In Connick, a district attorney who opposed her transfer to 
another section of the criminal court circulated a questionnaire to 
her fellow employees asking various questions about transfer policies, 
office morale, and confidence in supervisors, as well as one question 
about whether they “felt pressured to work in political campaigns.”36 
Evaluating the “content, form, and context” of the plaintiff’s 
questionnaire to determine whether it involved a matter of public 
concern, a slim majority of the Court held that only the last question 
concerning pressure to work in political campaigns was entitled to 
any First Amendment protection because the others simply involved 
her dissatisfaction with a proposed transfer.37 The last question was a 
matter of public concern, and not merely of personal interest to the 
employee, because pressuring employees to work for a political 
candidate “constitutes a coercion of belief in violation of 
fundamental constitutional rights.”38 The Court applied the 
Pickering balancing test to this last question only and concluded that 
the employee’s speech, which threatened a “mini-insurrection” that 
disrupted the office and undermined the close working relationships 
between assistants and their supervisors,39 outweighed the 
employee’s interest in her speech.40  
In its application of the Pickering balancing test, the Court made 
clear that “a wide degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is 
appropriate.”41 It is not necessary for an employer to “allow events 
to unfold” demonstrating the destructive nature of the employee’s 
speech.42 At the same time, the Court cautioned that had the 
employee’s speech “more substantially” involved a matter of public 
concern, an employer might have to make a stronger showing of 
disruption to prevail under the Pickering balancing test;43 in this 
case, the employee’s speech was intertwined and motivated not by 
“pure academic interest . . . to obtain useful research” but by a 
dispute she had with her supervisors over the office’s transfer 
 
 36. Connick, 461 U.S. at 141. 
 37. Id. at 147–49. 
 38. Id. at 149. 
 39. Id. at 151–52.  
 40. Id. at 154. 
 41. Id. at 152. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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policy.44 In addition, the employee distributed her questionnaire at 
work, which the Court found provided additional support to the 
employer’s disruption claims.45  
Four dissenting Justices rejected the majority’s parsing of Myers’s 
questionnaire and argued that it all implicated a matter of public 
concern.46 Focusing more on the actual content of the questionnaire 
rather than the employee’s motivation for circulating it, Justice 
Brennan, writing for the dissenters, argued that “[t]he 
constitutionally protected right to speak out on governmental affairs 
would be meaningless if it did not extend to statements expressing 
criticism of government officials,” which in this case involved 
criticizing the way the office was run.47 Brennan pointed out that 
Myers’s questionnaire would be of interest to anyone wishing to 
form an opinion on the ability of the elected District Attorney to run 
his office.48 Brennan argued that whether an employee’s speech 
involved a matter of public concern is more appropriately evaluated 
by considering the amount of disruption an employer must be 
required to tolerate.49 Brennan concluded that giving protection only 
to speech involving matters of general interest “‘is surely in conflict 
with the whole idea of the First Amendment.’”50 
In Rankin v. McPherson, the Court applied the 
Connick/Pickering framework to speech that was not directly related 
to the employee’s workplace.51 In Rankin, a clerical employee in a 
county constable’s office privately commented at work to her 
boyfriend and co-worker, upon hearing about the assassination 
attempt on President Reagan, “if they go for him again, I hope they 
get him.”52 Unknown to her, another co-worker overheard her 
comment and reported it to a supervisor.53 Both the majority and 
dissenting opinions applied Connick’s public concern inquiry as a 
 
 44. Id. at 153–54. 
 45. Id. at 153. 
 46.  Id. at 156 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 47. Id. at 162 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). 
 48. Id. at 163. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 164 n.4 (quoting T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
554 (1970)). 
 51. 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
 52. Id. at 381. 
 53.  Id. at 381–82. 
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threshold test for the employee’s First Amendment claims.54 The 
five-Justice majority held that this comment involved a matter of 
public concern because it was made in response to a major news 
bulletin and in the context of a larger conversation criticizing 
Reagan’s policies.55 In a footnote, the majority cited dicta in Connick 
that an employee’s speech that does not involve a matter of public 
concern does not fall outside the First Amendment, but that 
“‘absent the most unusual circumstances’” courts should not get 
involved in such cases.56 
Proceeding to the Pickering balancing test, the majority 
concluded that the government had failed to demonstrate that the 
employee interfered with the efficient functioning of the office or 
posed any danger of discrediting the office; she made the comment 
in a private conversation with another employee in an area at work to 
which there was no public access.57 Furthermore, the comment did 
not relate to the workplace, and the Constable did not terminate her 
employment out of concern that her comment indicated an unfitness 
to perform her duties.58 Although the employee worked in a law 
enforcement agency, the Court said that before it would accept the 
government’s argument that an employee’s speech “somehow 
undermines the mission of the public employer,” it is essential to 
keep in mind that she was merely a clerical employee with no 
confidential, policymaking, or public contact role.59  
Justice Powell authored a concurring opinion in which he 
expressed disbelief that the case had “assumed constitutional 
dimensions and reached the Supreme Court of the United States” 
even though it involved a comment that a low-level employee made 
to her boyfriend, who happened to be another employee, with no 
intention or expectation that anyone else would hear it.60 Although 
Powell stated that the comment involved a matter of public concern, 
this conclusion was not central to his analysis of the issue. Instead, 
his concurrence suggested that the employer had no interest 
whatsoever in restricting this sort of expression in the workplace, 
 
 54. Id. at 384–85; id. at 395–96 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 55. Id. at 386. 
 56. Id. at 384 n.7 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)). 
 57. Id. at 388–89. 
 58. Id. at 389. 
 59. Id. at 390–91. 
 60. Id. at 392–93 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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regardless of whether it was a matter of public concern. Powell 
concluded that “it will be an unusual case where the employer’s 
legitimate interests will be so great as to justify punishing an 
employee for this type of private speech that routinely takes place at 
all levels of the workplace.”61 Powell saw the case as a rather simple 
one where the employee “made an ill-considered—but protected—
comment during a private conversation, and [her boss] made an 
instinctive, but intemperate, employment decision on the basis of 
this speech.”62 
While the dissenting Justices in Connick thought the majority 
had applied the public concern requirement too narrowly, the four 
dissenting Justices in Rankin complained that the majority in that 
case had expanded the concept too broadly. They believed that the 
public concern requirement was originally intended to limit the 
ability of government employers to restrict public employee speech 
that lies “‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’”63 
Crediting the district court’s conclusion that McPherson’s statement 
was not political hyperbole, the dissenters argued that her desire that 
the President be assassinated was not protected political expression.64 
Instead, they contended, her statement was on the border of various 
unprotected categories of speech (like incitement and fighting 
words) and therefore could not be considered to be anywhere near 
the “heart” of the First Amendment.65  
The Rankin dissenters went on to argue that, even if her 
statement satisfied Connick’s public concern test, the government’s 
interest in preventing such statements outweighed her First 
Amendment interests in making the statement.66 They contended 
that law enforcement has a strong interest in preventing any of their 
employees from making violent comments like McPherson’s without 
having to show actual disruption or that the statement indicates that 
the employee is unsuitable to perform her duties.67 The dissenters 
argued that the statement did in fact pose a risk of undermining the 
 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 394. 
 63. Id. at 395 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 
776 (1978)). 
 64.  Id. at 396. 
 65. Id. at 397–98. 
 66. Id. at 399. 
 67.  Id.  
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public’s confidence in the constable’s office. Although she was a 
clerical worker, she had contact with the public when she answered 
the office telephone.68 Furthermore, the dissent took issue with the 
majority’s suggestion that the status of an employee should play an 
important role in determining the government’s interest in 
restricting expression. Instead, they argued that “[n]onpolicymaking 
employees . . . can hurt working relationships and undermine public 
confidence in an organization every bit as much as policymaking 
employees.”69 Although the dissenters appeared to give employers 
great leeway to discipline any employee, regardless of status, for his 
or her non-work-related comments made in private, it is worth 
noting that the dissenters repeatedly emphasized that the employee 
made her comment while on the job.70  
C. The Court’s Off-Duty/Non-Work-Related Cases: NTEU and Roe 
v. San Diego  
The Court’s cases leave unclear what sort of First Amendment 
protection attaches to expressive activities of off-duty public 
employees. Specifically, it is unclear whether all such speech must 
involve a matter of public concern to receive any First Amendment 
protection at all and whether the degree to which the expression is 
related to work affects the strength of any such protection.  
In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union 
(“NTEU”), the Court struck down a federal law banning all 
government employees from receiving honoraria for individual 
lectures, speeches, or articles outside of work, even when their off-
duty expression was not related to work in any way.71 Although the 
class action was a facial challenge, evidence presented to the district 
court revealed that some public employees had received 
compensation for articles on Russian history and radio and television 
reviews of dance performances.72 The Court purported to apply the 
Connick/Pickering framework in analyzing the constitutionality of 
the broad honoraria ban, but its approach to the public concern 
question was quite distinct compared to its analysis of the issue in its 
 
 68. Id. at 400. 
 69. Id.  
 70. See id. at 401 (mentioning “on the job” three times). 
 71. 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995). 
 72. Id. at 461. 
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prior cases. The Court concluded that government employees’ 
expressive activities subject to the ban fell “within the protected 
category of citizen comment on matters of public concern rather 
than employee comment on matters related to personal status in the 
workplace.”73 To justify its categorization of the infinite subjects of 
employees’ off-duty speech as matters of public concern, the Court 
explained that the activities subject to the honoraria ban “were 
addressed to a public audience, were made outside the workplace, 
and involved content largely unrelated to their government 
employment.”74 Embracing the employee/citizen dichotomy that 
pervades the Court’s cases in this area, the Court added that these 
expressive activities are entitled to presumptive First Amendment 
protection because the employees “seek compensation for their 
expressive activities in their capacity as citizens, not as Government 
employees.”75 Restrictions on their ability to be paid to speak 
threatened to chill their expression, thereby undermining not only 
their right to speak but also the public’s right to hear what they have 
to say.76  
After mentioning that the speech at issue involved matters of 
public concern, the Court applied the Pickering balancing test and 
concluded that the government’s interests did not outweigh the 
employees’ free speech interests.77 The broad sweep of the honoraria 
ban posed a significant restriction on both the right of employees to 
speak and on right of the public to hear what they have to say, but 
the government had failed to persuade the Court that its interest in 
efficiency and the appearance of impropriety justified a sweeping ban 
on the receipt of compensation by the “rank and file” of federal 
employees.78 Given that the ban applied to all compensation, and not 
just to that received for expressive activities with a nexus to the 
workplace activities, the Court held that the ban was not sufficiently 
tailored to serve the government’s interests.79 The three dissenting 
Justices, lead by Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued that the majority 
failed to give sufficient deference to Congress’s “reasonable” 
 
 73. Id. at 466. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 465. 
 76. Id. at 470. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 468–72. 
 79. Id. at 473–77. 
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determination that a general ban on honoraria was appropriate to 
avoid the impropriety, and the appearance of impropriety, that might 
be caused by government employees’ receiving compensation for 
expression outside of work.80 
The procedural posture of NTEU makes it difficult to determine 
with certainty what standard applies for off-duty employee speech. 
NTEU did not involve the application of the ban to any expression 
in particular, but instead was a broad facial challenge to the law. The 
Court suggested a significantly broader definition of what constitutes 
a matter of public concern, but it did so without an explicit 
acknowledgement of what it was doing. Instead, the Court seemed 
put off that the federal government would overreach to limit the 
liberty of its employees when they were not at work.  
In a more recent case, City of San Diego v. Roe,81 the Court 
missed an opportunity to offer a coherent First Amendment analysis 
of the protection afforded off-duty expression that does not clearly 
involve a matter of public concern. In this decision, which was 
decided per curiam without benefit of briefing or oral argument, the 
Court upheld the dismissal of a San Diego police officer “Roe” who 
created sexually explicit videos of himself stripping off a generic 
police officer uniform and masturbating.82 Roe posted these videos 
for sale on eBay under the code name “Code3stud@aol.com.” He 
also sold clothing and police equipment, including official uniforms 
of the San Diego Police Department, under the same code name.83 
The officer’s supervisor discovered the videos after he came across 
the official police uniforms for sale. He ran a search on eBay for 
other items “Code3stud@aol.com” was selling, found listings for the 
videos, and recognized Roe’s face.84 The supervisor shared this 
information with the chain of command. When confronted, Roe did 
not deny selling the police equipment and sexually explicit videos.85 
The police claimed that Roe violated several SDPD policies, 
including conduct unbecoming of an officer, immoral conduct, and 
outside employment. They ordered him to stop selling sexually 
explicit videos, but Roe refused and was charged with the additional 
 
 80. Id. at 492 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 81. 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam). 
 82. Id. at 78. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 78–79. 
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violation of failing to following orders. Roe was dismissed from the 
police force.86 There was no evidence that anyone other than Roe’s 
supervisors and the other officers involved in the investigation knew 
about Roe’s activities.87  
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected Roe’s First 
Amendment claim, but, as one commentator has noted, the Court’s 
analysis was “deeply unsatisfying.”88 The Court first noted that two 
tests had developed for evaluating a public employee’s free speech 
claims. Under Pickering and Connick, a public employee has the 
right to comment on matters of public concern related to his or her 
employment subject to a balancing test of competing interests.89 
Under NTEU, government employees also have a right to engage in 
expressive activities “on their own time on topics unrelated to their 
employment,” absent some government interest in restricting those 
activities that is “‘far stronger than mere speculation.’”90 The Court 
concluded that Roe’s claim could not survive either test.91  
The Court first distinguished NTEU, upon which the Ninth 
Circuit had relied heavily in ruling in favor of Roe.92 The Ninth 
Circuit had held that Roe’s expressive activities were protected 
because they did not involve an internal workplace grievance, they 
occurred while he was off-duty, and they were unrelated to his 
employment.93 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that although 
the videos were not related to Roe’s workplace in that they did not 
“comment on the workings or functioning” of his police 
department, they were in fact related to his employment because he 
“took deliberate steps to link his videos and other wares to his police 
work.”94 The Court noted that Roe had deliberately linked his 
expression to his employment by wearing a uniform, by referencing 
law enforcement on his Web site, by describing himself as “in the 
field of law enforcement,” and by creating a “debased parody of an 
 
 86. Id. at 79.  
 87. Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir.), rev’d per curiam, 543 
U.S. 77 (2004). 
 88. Rosenthal, supra note 11, at 64. 
 89. Roe, 543 U.S. at 80. 
 90. Id. (quoting United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 
(1995)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 79. 
 94. Id. at 81. 
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officer performing indecent acts while in the course of official 
duties.”95 The Court did not indicate that Roe’s activities 
undermined the police force’s confidence in his ability to perform his 
professional duties, but rather that these activities “brought the 
mission of the employer and the professionalism of its officers into 
serious disrepute.”96  
Although in NTEU the Court applied both Connick and 
Pickering, the Court in Roe did not, perhaps indicating that neither 
inquiry was required for speech in the off-duty/non-work-related 
category. At least one commentator has suggested that the Court 
must have concluded that off-duty, non-work-related expressive 
activities are entitled to almost the same robust constitutional 
protection that citizens at large would enjoy.97 Indeed, this view 
makes some sense in light of the Court’s description of the NTEU 
case as stemming from a separate “line of cases” from Pickering and 
Connick.98 This may be what the Court intended to hold, but this 
approach is not consistent with NTEU itself, which applied both 
Connick and Pickering to off-duty, non-work-related expression. In 
addition, lower courts have not interpreted Roe this way.99 It is hard 
to know what the Court meant to do in this unusually poorly 
reasoned opinion.  
Furthermore, even if the Court did intend to hold that off-duty, 
non-work-related expression enjoys almost full constitutional 
protection, the Court defined “work-related” too broadly to do 
most plaintiffs any good.100 The Court’s conclusion in Roe that the 
expressive activities at issue were work-related rested primarily on 
concerns that they were detrimental to the SDPD’s mission. Indeed, 
it is worth noting that the City of San Diego had not argued in the 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  
 97. See Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship, supra note 11, at 132.  
 98. Roe, 543 U.S. at 80. 
 99. See, e.g., Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 925–29 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(explaining that if the speech is work-related, then the employee must satisfy both Connick and 
Pickering; if the speech is not work-related, the employee must still prevail under the Pickering 
balancing test, but that Roe does not make clear whether the employee must show that his 
expressive activities are matters of public concern); Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 
470 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 2006) (applying Connick and Pickering to off-duty, non-work-related 
expression; the court virtually ignored Roe and focused on the mode of analysis in NTEU); 
Navab-Safavi v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, 650 F. Supp. 2d 40, 55–62 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(applying the same analysis as Scarbrough). 
 100. See Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship, supra note 11, at 133. 
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lower courts that Roe’s expression was work related,101 and, the 
Supreme Court’s holding to the contrary, it is not obvious how it 
was. These videos certainly did not comment directly on police 
activities. Although Roe’s expressive activities were not in private, 
they were done in practical anonymity. He was not wearing his San 
Diego police force uniform, and he did not identify himself as a 
member of the San Diego police force. The only reason his 
supervisors discovered that he was engaging in this behavior was by 
searching for other items for sale by a person offering SDPD police 
officer uniforms.  
After concluding that Roe’s case fell outside of the more robust 
speech protections offered under NTEU, the Court turned to the 
Connick/Pickering framework.102 The Court concluded that Roe’s 
expressive activities did not satisfy Connick’s threshold public 
concern requirement. The Court explained that to satisfy the public 
concern requirement, the expression must involve “something that is 
a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general 
interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of 
publication.”103 The Court took this definition from two of its prior 
cases involving the common law right of privacy, Cox Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Cohn and Time, Inc. v. Hill.104 The Court said that it was 
“not a close case” under any conception of the definition of public 
concern because it offered nothing of value to persons interested in 
evaluating the effectiveness of SDPD’s operations.105 The Court also 
said that Roe’s activities were nothing like the private expression at 
issue in Rankin because Roe’s expression “was widely broadcast, 
linked to his official status as a police officer, and designed to exploit 
his employer’s image.”106 
 
 101. Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1112 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he 
defendants have not argued that Roe’s speech is in any way related to his employment with the 
San Diego Police Department or the City, nor do they argue that offering to sell a uniform 
formerly used by the SDPD somehow linked Roe’s videos to the Department.”). 
 102. City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 81–82. 
 103. Id. at 83–84. 
 104.  Id. at 83. 
 105. Id. at 84. 
 106. Id. 
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D. Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Invocation of the Government Speech 
Doctrine  
The Court’s most recent decision in this area erected yet another 
barrier in the path of First Amendment protection for the speech of 
government employees. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, deputy district 
attorney Richard Ceballos alleged he was subjected to a series of 
retaliatory actions after he wrote a memo questioning the accuracy of 
an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant. Writing for the 
Court, Justice Kennedy held that rather than asking initially whether 
the expression at issue involved a matter of public concern, the 
inquiry should be whether Ceballos was speaking “as a citizen” or 
“as an employee.”107 Employees speaking as “citizens” about matters 
of public concern must be subject to “only those speech restrictions 
that are necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and 
effectively.”108 Speech made by an employee acting pursuant to his 
“official duties,” however, is categorically excluded from First 
Amendment protection. Because there was no dispute that Ceballos 
wrote the memo pursuant to his job duties, Justice Kennedy 
concluded that the First Amendment offered him no protection.109 
Although the Court had referred to the concept of public 
employees speaking in their capacity “as citizens” and “as 
employees” in its prior cases, Garcetti was the first time that the 
Court held that this categorization must take place at the start of any 
First Amendment inquiry. Before Garcetti, the Court appeared to 
regard any employee speech on a matter of public concern as speech 
made as a citizen, even if made at work, and that such speech was 
entitled to some constitutional protection. After Garcetti, if an 
employee’s speech is made pursuant to his official duties, he is no 
longer acting as a citizen entitled to some modicum of First 
Amendment protection. Instead, that person is speaking entirely as 
an employee and loses all constitutional protection for his speech. 
Garcetti’s stripping of constitutional protection for any speech made 
in the scope of the employee’s duties marks a significant retreat in 
the free speech rights for government employees and adds yet 
another obstacle to an employee’s First Amendment claim.  
 
 107. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418–19 (2006). 
 108. Id. at 419. 
 109. Id. at 421–25. 
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In reaching this holding, the Court reiterated as it had in prior 
cases that a citizen who becomes a public employee “by necessity 
must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom” because 
government employers must be afforded some leeway to control 
their employees’ speech in order to provide services efficiently.110 In 
addition, the expression of trusted public officials may “contravene 
governmental policies or impair the proper performance of 
governmental functions.”111 Although Kennedy, writing for the 
majority, recognized the valuable contributions government 
employees can make to the public debate as well as the public’s right 
to receive these contributions, he concluded that the government’s 
interest as employer trumped these interests.112 He contended that 
whistleblower protection laws and labor codes would sufficiently 
protect employees who expose unlawful and otherwise inappropriate 
actions.113 
Perhaps the most curious part of this opinion is that the Court 
invoked the government speech doctrine to justify its holding. 
Kennedy wrote that “[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to a 
public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any 
liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It 
simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the 
employer itself has commissioned or created.”114 Kennedy included a 
“cf” citation to Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of 
Virginia, which interpreted the Court’s decision in Rust v. Sullivan 
as meaning that “when the government appropriates public funds to 
promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it 
wishes.”115  
In dissent, Justice Souter criticized the majority’s invocation of 
the government speech doctrine in the context of this case.116 Souter 
argued that while the government is entitled to control the speech of 
employees who are hired to promote a particular message, an 
assistant district attorney is not such an employee. He was not hired 
 
 110. Id. at 418, 421–25. 
 111. Id. at 419. 
 112.  Id. at 419–23. 
 113. Id. at 425–26. 
 114. Id. at 421–22 (including a “cf” citation to Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. 
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)). 
 115. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. 
 116. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 436–39 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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to promote any particular message aside from “the relatively abstract 
point of favoring respect for law and its evenhanded enforcement.”117 
Souter conceded that the government had an interest in ensuring 
that Ceballos engaged in evenhanded and lawful prosecutions, that 
he not needlessly create tension within the workplace, and that he 
not make inaccurate and misleading statements in the course of his 
work, but the presence of these government interests do not render 
everything Ceballos says in the course of his work “government 
speech.”118  
Justice Souter, whose dissent was joined by Justices Stevens and 
Ginsburg, also challenged the majority’s decision to draw a “strange 
line” between employee-speech and citizen-speech and argued that 
the balancing of individual and public interests could be taken into 
account through the Pickering balancing test.119 Souter suggested 
that one factor that should be taken into the balance was that 
employee expression have a “minimum heft” to outweigh the 
government-employers’ legitimate authority to control it.120 But he 
argued that often the value of government-employee speech will be 
even greater when they are speaking pursuant to their official duties 
because they are more likely to know what they are talking about.121 
This sort of expression may also be particularly important to the 
employees, who may, Souter contended, “share the poet’s 
‘object . . . to unite [m]y avocation and my vocation.’”122 Souter also 
took issue with the majority’s reliance on whistleblower laws to 
protect reporting on wrongdoing by government actors because the 
protections these laws afford vary greatly among local, state, and 
federal jurisdictions.123  
 
 117. Id. at 437. 
 118. Id. at 438. 
 119. Id. at 434. 
 120. Id. at 434–35. 
 121. Id. at 430–31. 
 122. Id. at 432 (quoting Robert Frost, Two Tramps in Mud Time, in COLLECTED 
POEMS, PROSE, & PLAYS 251, 252 (Richard Poirier & Mark Richardson eds., 1995)). 
 123. Id. at 439–41. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion in which he took a middle 
road between Justice Kennedy’s and Justice Souter’s approaches. Breyer argued that in most 
cases employee speech made in the course of employment is not entitled to First Amendment 
protection because the government has legitimate need to control such speech. However, 
Justice Breyer contended that the Pickering test should apply in cases like this where an 
employee faces professional and constitutional requirements obligating him to speak. Id. at 
444–49 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Although Garcetti involved employee expression during the 
course of his work duties, the broader theory of Garcetti—that 
government employees have no First Amendment rights when they 
speak on behalf of their employers—has potential application in the 
off-duty context, at least when the public might perceive the 
employee as representing the government’s views. 
III. CONFUSION IN THE LOWER COURTS 
The lower courts disagree about whether and how to apply the 
public concern inquiry to off-duty expressive activities as well as how 
to conduct the Pickering balancing test. Given the mixed messages 
the Supreme Court has sent on the public concern requirement, this 
confusion is not surprising. Since Connick, many courts and 
commentators have questioned the wisdom of having such a 
threshold requirement.124 This test has proven particularly difficult to 
apply in cases that are not directly related to the workplace. Lower 
courts have also struggled to apply the Pickering balancing test to 
off-duty speech and to figure how the balancing of interests should 
be done. All of these unanswered questions leave the Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area a huge mess.  
A. Criticisms of a Public Concern Requirement 
Connick has been the target of extensive scholarly criticism. 
Connick’s assertion that speech on public issues is at the heart of the 
First Amendment was not a new idea. The Court has frequently 
embraced the importance of political debate to democratic self-
governance in expanding the protections of the First Amendment in 
a variety of contexts, from incitement to libel to commercial speech 
to labor picketing to the creation of the public forum doctrine.125 
 
 124. See, e.g., Allred, supra note 11 (advocating for a rejection of Connick’s threshold 
inquiry in favor of Pickering balancing in all cases); Massaro, supra note 11 (arguing for an 
alternative to Connick that instead asks as a threshold matter whether the speech is 
“permissible street corner discourse” before proceeding to Pickering balancing). But see R. 
George Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 27 
(1987) (embracing Connick’s threshold inquiry but suggesting that the inquiry be refined to 
consider whether the speaker could have “generalized” his speech for a broader public 
discussion). 
 125. For a more extensive discussion of how the Court has reshaped First Amendment to 
protect speech on public issues, see Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern, supra note 
11, at 13–20; Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand and the Self-Government Theory of the First 
Amendment: Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
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Connick is unusual, however, because it is rare for the Court to 
embrace the inverse principle that speech that does not involve a 
matter of public concern falls outside of the First Amendment. The 
Court used a public concern inquiry to strip First Amendment 
protection from speech, rather than to extend protection to it.  
The adoption of a public concern test in the context of 
government employees was the first time a majority of the Court 
explicitly stratified speech related to public and private matters.126 
This approach is inconsistent with the Court’s statements in other 
cases that its decisions “have never suggested that expression about 
philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters—
to take a non-exhaustive list of labels—is not entitled to full First 
Amendment protection.”127 In Connick, the Court focused 
exclusively on only one instrumental theory of the First 
Amendment—the promotion of political debate—and failed to 
consider the other values the freedom of speech serves. 
NTEU and Roe fail to answer conclusively whether courts must 
make a public concern inquiry in every government employee First 
Amendment case and if so, what that inquiry looks like. In NTEU, 
the Court analyzed the honoraria ban only as applied to matters of 
public concern. Furthermore, in holding that lectures on Russian 
history and radio and television reviews of dance performances 
constituted matters of public concern, the Court applied a rather 
broad conception of matters of public concern, at least as compared 
to the approach the Court took in Connick and Rankin. Indeed, the 
Court did not seem to care about the actual content of the 
employees’ speech but instead appeared particularly concerned that 
the honoraria ban applied to speech that did not take place at work 
and had no connection to work.128 
In Roe, the Court performed two alternative analyses, only one 
of which involved the public concern inquiry. Had the Court 
believed that public concern was a threshold requirement in all cases, 
there would have been no need for the Court to continue on to 
 
 126. For a more extensive discussion of this point, see Estlund, Speech on Matters of 
Public Concern, supra note 11, at 20–23. 
 127. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977). 
 128. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995) (noting 
that the employees’ expressive activities “were addressed to a public audience, were made 
outside the workplace, and involved content largely unrelated to their government 
employment”). 
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examine the SDPD’s interest in restricting the randy officer’s 
expression once it concluded it was not a matter of public concern.  
The Court made things even more confusing when it applied the 
public concern standard to Roe’s pornographic activities on eBay. 
Rather than stopping after noting that Roe’s activities “did nothing 
to inform the public about any aspect of the SDPD’s functioning or 
operation,” the Court went on to remark that Roe’s expression “was 
widely broadcast, linked to his official status as a police officer, and 
designed to exploit his employer’s image,” and that it also “was 
detrimental to the mission and functions of the employer.”129 The 
only one of these factors that has traditionally been considered part 
of a public concern inquiry is whether the speech was made privately 
or to the general public, and the Court’s prior cases have indicated 
that speech directed to the general public is more likely to be labeled 
speech as a matter of public concern.130 That his expression 
“exploited his employer’s image” and undermined the “mission and 
functions” of the police seem to have nothing at all to do with the 
public concern inquiry; instead, they are the sort of factors a court 
might take into account when conducting the Pickering balancing 
test. 
 The narrow view of public concern that the Court embraced 
in Connick and Roe was not only inconsistent with its approach in 
Rankin and NTEU, but it was also inconsistent with the Court’s 
approach to this same inquiry in privacy and defamation contexts. 
The Court’s privacy cases have taken a much broader approach to 
the public concern question.131 Most notably, in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 
the Court invoked a public concern requirement to strike down a 
false light claim based on a fictionalized depiction of a family who 
suffered a home invasion.132 The Court explained that “[t]he 
guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political 
expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to 
 
 129. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004). 
 130. The officer’s extracurricular activities were directed to the public on an eBay site, 
and although we do not know the numbers of people who were interested in his particular 
pornographic offerings, we do know that pornography in the United States is extremely (if not 
secretly) popular. 
 131. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 165 n.5 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(discussing that the majority’s approach to the public concern inquiry in Connick was 
inconsistent with the Court’s evaluation of the same issue in its privacy cases).  
 132. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
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healthy government.”133 Instead, the “‘[f]reedom of discussion, if it 
would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all 
issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable 
the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their 
period.’”134 Furthermore, although the magazine article at issue in 
Hill functioned more to entertain than to inform, the Court 
concluded that “‘[t]he line between the informing and the 
entertaining is too elusive for the protection of . . . [freedom of the 
press].’”135 It is difficult to square the conclusion that a fictionalized, 
entertaining article about a house invasion is a matter of public 
concern while an employee’s criticisms of her government employer 
are (usually) not. Instead, these cases can make sense only if the 
government’s interest in restricting its employee’s speech is taken 
into account in making the public concern determination, but this is 
not what the Court professes to be doing.  
Subsequent cases in the employment context indicate that the 
Court continues to be deeply divided on how to interpret and apply 
Connick’s public concern requirement. In Rankin, for example, only 
a slim majority concluded that the employee’s remark about the 
assassination attempt on President Reagan was a matter of public 
concern; the four dissenting Justices concluded that it was not 
because this sort of hyperbolic comment was too close to the 
margins of unprotected expression.136 For the majority, it was 
sufficient that the underlying subject matter of her comment 
involved a matter of public concern, even if the specific comment did 
not contribute much of value to the public discussion of that issue 
and was not directed to the public.137 In Gavhin, the Court held that 
private communications—in that case, allegations of discriminatory 
conduct—can be matters of public concern because it is the content 
of those communications that matter, not the audience. In NTEU, 
the Court offered yet another approach to the public concern 
question. This approach focuses the inquiry on the location, time, 
 
 133. Id. at 388. 
 134. Id. (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 135. Id. (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 136. See supra note 65 and accompanying text; Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378; id. 
at 395–96 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 137. See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 386–87. 
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and audience of the speech rather than its precise content. The 
Court held that speech that is addressed to a public audience, made 
outside of the workplace, and involves content “largely unrelated to 
their Government employment” is speech on a matter of public 
concern.138 This is a significantly more expansive definition of 
matters of public concern than the Court offered in Connick.  
For most people, their personal experiences—work-related or 
not—affect their views on political and social issues, and stories they 
hear about others’ personal experiences can have a similar effect. 
(This no doubt accounts for the common political strategy of finding 
“real people” to tell their story to the American public in order to 
generate support for a particular measure or candidate.) Connick’s 
limited view of what constitutes a matter of public concern 
inappropriately discounts these personal experiences.139 In contrast, 
the Court determined that the off-hand comment at issue in Rankin 
was a matter of public concern simply because it related to a political 
figure, even though it likely would add much less to the public 
debate than the personnel grievance deemed outside the public 
debate in Connick. This is not to say that the Court reached the 
wrong result in Rankin, but simply that its reasoning was less than 
satisfying.  
In Roe, the Court further muddied the waters on what exactly is 
meant by a matter of public concern, particularly when applied to 
off-duty expressive activities. The Court concluded that “under any 
view of the public concern test,” the officer’s activities failed it.140 
There, the Court said that a matter of public concern is one that “is 
a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general 
interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of 
publication.”141 This is a very narrow view of what constitutes a 
matter of public concern. Indeed, the Court noted that even the 
dissenters in Connick would have applied a test that considered 
whether the speech would help persons interested in developing 
“‘informed opinions about the manner in which . . . an elected 
official charged with managing a vital governmental agency, 
 
 138. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 (1995). 
 139. See Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern, supra note 11, at 37–38. 
 140. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004). 
 141. Id. at 83–84. 
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discharges his responsibilities,’” without a requirement that the 
expression contribute to a public debate that is already ongoing.142  
This dispute highlights another aspect of a public concern 
inquiry that is uncertain: whether it is a normative (what should be a 
matter of public concern) or descriptive one (what is a matter of 
public concern).143 The latter approach threatens to greatly 
undermine public employee speech when the employees have inside 
information that should be a matter of public concern. However, it is 
often the case that before they speak there is not an ongoing public 
discussion to which the public employee is contributing. This is 
frequently the case when government employees serve as 
whistleblowers. In addition, a test that considers the actual 
“popularity” of a particular subject may result in the overprotection 
of speech that is not particularly valuable—such as most celebrity 
gossip—and penalizes less popular speech, even if it does involve a 
meaningful topic.  
In determining whether speech involves a matter of public 
concern, it is unclear how large this audience must be to be “public” 
and how we figure out whether the speech at issue is of sufficient 
“concern” to them. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders 
Inc., the Court concluded that a credit report indicating that a 
company was bankrupt was not a matter of public concern in part 
because only five business subscribers received it.144 As Justice 
Brennan argued in his dissent, however, the very same content 
clearly would have been a matter of public concern had it appeared 
in a newspaper or magazine; the fact that the credit report had a 
limited circulation and was published by a non-media entity for 
commercial gain should not change the analysis.  After all, “[f]ew 
published statements are of universal interest, and few publications 
are distributed without charge.”145  In the digital age, the public 
concern inquiry has become even more difficult as infinite numbers 
of communities exist. What is a matter of great concern to one may 
 
 142. See id. at 84 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 163 (1983) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 143. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, 
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 670, 672 
(1990). 
 144.  472 U.S. 749 (1985) (Powell, J.) (plurality opinion); id. at 763 (Burger, C.J., 
concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that credit report was not matter of public concern); id. 
at 765 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (same). 
 145.  Id. at 783 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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be of no concern to another. Much of the content that does attract a 
broad swath of the public is merely entertaining (think YouTube 
videos that go viral). The size of the audience is not necessarily a 
useful measurement of what constitutes a matter of public concern.  
Because there is no precise definition of what constitutes a 
matter of public concern and what does not, the threshold public 
concern requirement makes it hard for both public employees and 
their employers to know what speech is constitutionally protected. 
This vague standard can result in the chilling of otherwise protected 
speech. It also can lead to inconsistent rulings. Employees with 
lawyers who can spin their private expressive activities as part of a 
larger political debate will be able to pass the Connick threshold, 
while those who are not skilled at creating that sort of narrative will 
find their claims dead on arrival.146 
B. Disagreement Among the Lower Courts 
The doctrinal confusion surrounding the public concern inquiry 
outlined above has played itself out in the lower courts, which have 
struggled to determine whether it is necessary to apply the public 
concern test in all cases involving off-duty expression, and if so, what 
the alternative approach to such cases should be.147 Although many 
courts routinely apply the public concern test in all their government 
employee cases,148 others have recognized that applying the test does 
not always make sense. To deal with this problem, some courts faced 
 
 146. Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible Content Discrimination Under the First 
Amendment: The Strange Case of the Public Employee, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 555–56 
(1998).  
 147. Of course in many cases it is not difficult to conclude that an employee’s off-duty 
speech activities involve a matter of public concern. For example, in one recent decision, a 
federal district court concluded that it was “beyond dispute” that a federal employee’s music 
video criticizing United States involvement in Iraq involved a matter of public concern. See 
Navab-Safavi v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, 650 F. Supp. 2d 40, 55 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 148. See, e.g., Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 256 (6th Cir. 
2006) (applying public concern inquiry in case involving former superintendent’s offer to 
speak at a convention sponsored by a church with a predominantly gay congregation); Tindle 
v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 970–71 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying a threshold public concern test to 
a case involving an officer who wore a racially offensive costume to a Halloween party widely 
attended by other members of the force); Karins v. City of Atl. City, 706 A.2d 706, 715–16 
(N.J. 1998) (holding that a racial epithet uttered by an off-duty firefighter during a police stop 
“was not remotely related to any matter of public concern”); Hawkins v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety 
& Corr. Servs., 602 A.2d 712, 717–18 (1992) (holding that off-duty prison guard’s anti-
Semetic outburst directed to a bank teller was not entitled to any First Amendment protection 
because it did not implicate a matter of public concern). 
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with cases that involve off-duty speech have refused to apply a public 
concern test,149 others have embraced a broad conception of public 
concern,150 and many have simply chosen to dodge this difficult issue 
altogether by concluding that the plaintiffs would lose anyway even if 
they could satisfy this inquiry.151 In addition, courts have struggled 
to determine whether the Pickering balancing test should apply to 
off-duty speech and how to apply Roe’s “work-related” inquiry. 
1. Confusion with the public concern inquiry 
The conceptual difficulties of applying the public concern test, as 
framed in Connick, to non-work-related, off-duty speech has lead 
some courts to hold that this threshold inquiry does not apply at all 
in such cases.152 The leading case to take this approach is Flanagan v. 
Munger from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.153 
Flanagan involved a small group of high-ranking police officers who 
operated a video rental store. Sexually explicit adult films comprised 
less than four percent of the store’s inventory. Store policy permitted 
only adults over twenty-one to rent these films, and none of the films 
was obscene under federal, state, or local law or in any other way 
contained unlawful content.154 The police chief learned that the store 
contained some pornographic films and conducted an investigation; 
the officers were not reprimanded but complied with the chief’s 
suggestion that they remove the pornographic inventory from the 
 
 149. See, e.g., Eberhardt v. O’Malley, 17 F.3d 1023 (7th Cir. 1994); Flanagan v. 
Munger, 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1989).  
 150. See, e.g., Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 997 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 151. These courts tend to hold that it is not necessary to determine whether the speech 
involved a matter of public concern because even if it did, the government would prevail under 
the Pickering balancing test. See, e.g., Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 927–29 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (holding it was not necessary to determine whether officer’s sexually explicit videos 
involved matter of public concern because the City of Chandler would prevail under Pickering 
regardless); Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 175 (2d Cir. 2006) (assuming without 
deciding that a racially offensive public float related to a matter of public concern); Melzer v. 
Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 196 (2d Cir. 2003) (assuming without deciding that teacher’s 
membership in NAMBLA and advocacy for change in laws regarding sexual relationships with 
minors satisfied public concern requirement); Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 146 (2d Cir. 
2002) (assuming without deciding that racist materials constituted speech on a matter of 
public concern). 
 152. Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1564 (“[T]he Connick public concern test is intended to 
weed out speech by an employee speaking as an employee upon matters of only personal 
interest.”); Pereira v. Commonwealth, 733 N.E.2d 112, 120–21 (Mass. 2000). 
 153. Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1562–63. 
 154. Id. at 1560 & n.2. 
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store. After the local press ran some stories about the investigation, 
the chief reprimanded the officers, and the officers filed suit claiming 
that their First Amendment rights had been violated.155  
In reviewing the district court’s decision to grant summary 
judgment to the defendants, the Tenth Circuit said that in a public 
employee case, it would normally ask first whether the expression 
involved a matter of public concern.156 The court noted that the case 
before it differed significantly from the typical Pickering/Connick 
fact pattern because it did not involve speech about work. Although 
the Court applied the public concern test to speech that was 
unrelated to work in Rankin, in that case the challenged comment 
was made at the workplace.157 The court held that the public concern 
test does not apply in cases involving nonverbal expression that is 
neither at work nor about work.158 Driving the court’s conclusion 
was the difficulty of applying the test in this particular case, which 
involved the ownership of a video store. The court noted that it was 
hard to say what, if anything, the officers were saying by offering 
pornographic videos for rent.159 Even if it were possible to conclude 
that the officers were making a statement about the desirability of 
such films, the court held that it would be hard to imagine how this 
implicit statement could contribute to the public debate on that 
issue.160 Given the difficulties of determining whether the police 
officers’ activity involved a matter of public concern, the court 
decided instead to adopt a threshold test that asks merely whether 
the expressive activity at issue constituted “protected expression.”161  
The Seventh Circuit has taken a similar approach. In Eberhardt v. 
O’Malley, an assistant state’s attorney wrote “a fictional novel 
involving fictitious prosecutors and other persons in the criminal 
justice system.”162 The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s First 
Amendment claim because, in the court’s view, it did not involve a 
matter of public concern by failing to inform the public about 
possible wrongdoing in the State’s Attorney’s Office or any other 
 
 155. Id. at 1560–61. 
 156. Id. at 1562. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 1563. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 1564. 
 162. Eberhardt v. O’Malley, 17 F.3d 1023, 1024 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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matter of public concern.163 The Seventh Circuit reversed.164 Judge 
Posner, writing for the panel, criticized the lower court’s decision in 
two different ways. Posner first suggested that the lower court 
applied the public concern test too narrowly because a fictional novel 
could in fact meaningfully contribute to the public debate by 
offering insights into the workings of the criminal justice system. He 
noted a long history of “sociological and muckraking novels,” many 
of which were written by employees on the inside.165  
More fundamentally, Judge Posner criticized the district court 
for failing to recognize that “[t]he First Amendment protects 
entertainment as well as treatises on politics and public 
administration.”166 As a result, the government employer could not 
discipline the employee for his novel unless it had a reason.167 Posner 
argued that in Connick the Court simply intended “‘to distinguish 
grievances of an entirely personal character from statements of 
broader interest concerning one’s job, rather than to fix the 
boundaries of the First Amendment.’”168 Posner proposed taking the 
value of the speech at issue into account in the Pickering balancing 
process, where “[t]he less serious, portentous, political, significant 
the genre of expression, the less imposing the justification that the 
government must put forth in order to be permitted to suppress the 
expression.”169 The public concern test, Posner argued, is really just 
shorthand for distinguishing between speech that is socially valuable 
and speech that is not.170 Judge Posner did not consider NTEU’s 
approach to the public concern inquiry because the Court had not 
yet decided that case.  
Some courts have found it particularly difficult to apply 
Connick’s public concern test in cases involving the right of 
association.171 As the Second Circuit has noted, applying the test in 
 
 163. Id. at 1025.  
 164. Id. at 1029. 
 165. Id. at 1026. 
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. (quoting Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1990) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 169. Id.  
 170. Id. at 1027. 
 171. See, e.g., Hatcher v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 809 F.2d 1546, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that Connick does not apply to right of association claims). But see Hudson v. Craven, 
403 F.3d 691, 698 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying Connick in case involving participation in a 
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association cases is “awkward” given the Court’s instructions to 
consider the content, context, and form of the expression at issue 
when conducting a public concern inquiry because associations “may 
deliver many different statements at many different times and places 
and under many different circumstances.”172 
Other courts that have recognized the theoretical and practical 
difficulties of applying Connick’s public concern test in off-duty cases 
have chosen to embrace a broad conception of what the public 
concern standard requires rather than to discard the test entirely. In 
Berger v. Battaglia, for example, the Fourth Circuit applied the 
public concern test in a case involving a police officer’s popular off-
duty public music performances at nightclubs and other venues, 
including his impersonation of the late singer Al Jolson in 
blackface.173 The court concluded that these performances 
“constituted speech upon a matter of obvious public interest” to the 
large numbers of persons who paid to hear him perform.174 The 
court concluded that the fact that his speech was merely 
entertainment “presumably neutral as to any political or even social 
views” did not remove it from this category.175  
More recently, the Sixth Circuit applied the public concern test 
in a case where a superintendent candidate alleged he was not 
selected for the position due to the city’s reaction to an (inaccurate) 
newspaper article reporting that he had accepted an invitation to 
speak at a convention sponsored by a church with a predominantly 
gay congregation.176 Because the superintendent had not in fact 
accepted the invitation, it would have been impossible for the circuit 
court to consider the actual content of that speech to determine 
whether it involved a matter of public concern. The court dodged 
that problem by focusing on NTEU’s broader approach to the public 
concern inquiry. Because the speech would not have occurred during 
work hours or at the workplace, would have been presented to a 
 
WTO protest activity, a hybrid speech/association claim, because it was easy to conclude the 
expressive activities at issue involved a matter of public concern). 
 172. Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 196 (2d Cir. 2003). Although the Second 
Circuit has recently applied the public concern test in an association case, Piscottano v. 
Murphy, 511 F.3d 247, 274 (2d Cir. 2007), an earlier panel decision suggested that it would 
be inappropriate to do so. Melzer, 336 F.3d at 196. 
 173. See Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 993, 997–99 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 174. Id. at 999. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 253–54 (6th Cir. 2006). 
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public audience, and would not have related to his employment, the 
court concluded his non-existent “intended speech” was a matter of 
public concern.177 
2. Applying Roe’s “work-relatedness” inquiry 
Roe suggested, though not conclusively, that if speech is outside 
work and is not work-related, an employee does not have to satisfy a 
public concern inquiry and that even the Pickering balancing test 
does not apply. Unfortunately, Roe undermined any extra 
constitutional protection it may have offered off-duty, non-work-
related expression by defining “work-related” extraordinarily 
broadly. Prior to Roe, courts generally adopted a common-sense 
interpretation of when speech was work related, limiting it to speech 
that referred to internal workplace disputes or the employee’s own 
employment situation.178 In contrast, Roe suggested that work-
related expressive activities are not merely those that refer to the 
subject matter of plaintiff’s government employment or to 
supervisors and co-workers but also speech that undermines the 
mission of the employer and reflects poorly on the employee’s fitness 
for his profession. Not many courts have had the opportunity to 
apply this expansive “work-relatedness” inquiry suggested in Roe, 
but these few cases reveal some uncertainty about how to do it.  
After Roe, the Ninth Circuit heard another case involving a 
policeman who was punished when it was discovered he ran a 
sexually explicit website. This case was arguably distinguishable from 
Roe because Officer Dible’s website primarily featured his wife, and it 
did not invoke his police work in any way.179 The court nevertheless 
concluded that Dible’s involvement with the sexually explicit website 
was work-related because ultimately the public did learn about his 
connection with the website. The court also noted that “it can be 
seriously asked whether a police officer can ever disassociate himself 
from his powerful public position sufficiently to make his speech 
 
 177. Id. at 257–58. The circuit court also cited as apparently relevant the plaintiff’s 
statements during a newspaper interview that he “didn’t do it as a Morgan County 
Superintendent of Schools but as an individual and friend of the man who invited him.” Id. at 
258. 
 178. See, e.g., Pereira v. Comm’r of Soc. Servs., 733 N.E.2d 112, 120 (Mass. 2000) 
(noting that racially offensive joke employee told at retirement dinner was not work-related 
because it did not involve internal office affairs or the employee’s employment status).  
 179. Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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(and other activities) entirely unrelated to that position in the eyes of 
the public and his superiors,” and his activities “had the same 
practical effect” as Roe’s X-rated activities—they “‘brought the 
mission of the employer and the professionalism of its officers into 
serious disrepute.’” 180  
The federal district court in Navab-Safavi v. Broadcasting Board 
of Governors took a more restrictive view of the work-relatedness 
inquiry in a case involving a Voice of America translator who 
participated in a music video criticizing the United States’ invasion 
of Iraq.181 The court held that the videos were unrelated to her 
government work because she made the videos on her own time, 
without using government resources, without mentioning VOA or 
any of its activities or employees, and without mentioning that she 
worked for VOA.182 Notably, although the Court in Roe found it 
relevant that the plaintiff had used a generic police officer’s uniform 
in his strip routines, the court in Navab-Safavi found that the music 
video was not related to the translator’s work at VOA, even though 
the challenged music video was superficially similar to a VOA 
broadcast, set in a television studio featuring an anchorperson sitting 
behind a desk and delivering news and commentary.183  
Although Roe also suggests that an employee’s speech may be 
work related if it undermines the mission and functions of the 
employer, the district court ignored that expansive view of work-
relatedness and instead cited NTEU, which held that expressive 
activities are not work-related when they have at most “an indirect 
nexus to her workplace by virtue of an ‘adverse impact on the 
efficiency of the office in which plaintiff worked.’”184 The court 
rejected the government’s argument that the employee’s 
participation in the music videos “drew her objectivity into 
question” because the argument was based on mere speculation, 
given that there was no evidence that “plaintiff ever mistranslated 
anything, that her translations were found to be biased, or that the 
audience perceived such bias in her translations.”185 The court also 
 
 180. Id. at 926 (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 81 (2004)). 
 181. 650 F. Supp. 2d 40 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 182. Id. at 55. 
 183. Id. at 59 n.7. 
 184. Id. at 57 (quoting United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 
(1995)). 
 185. Id. at 58–59.  
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rejected the contention that her activities “compromised VOA’s 
journalistic integrity and credibility.”186 The court noted that no one 
would have associated the videos with VOA because the plaintiff 
“was not held out to the public as a representative of VOA, as she 
never appeared on-air as a VOA worker, and her name was never 
used on-air in association with her services.”187 
3. Whether and how to apply Pickering’s balancing test  
The lower courts have also reached different conclusions about 
how and when to conduct the Pickering balancing test. Before 
NTEU, some courts questioned whether the balancing test was 
appropriate at all for expression outside of work. After that case, the 
Court has suggested that the Pickering test does apply in such cases, 
but it is hardly clear that it should.188 Even if a balancing test is 
appropriate in such cases, questions remain about how to conduct it. 
Courts struggle to determine the “value” of speech, especially when 
it does not involve political speech, and how to evaluate the 
government employer’s interests in restricting expression that is not 
clearly about work. 
 a. Does the test apply at all? The first question is whether the 
Pickering balancing test applies to all public employee expression 
that takes place outside of work. The Pickering balancing test was 
developed in a particular context to address the need to give 
employees the opportunity to discuss public issues while protecting 
the government employer’s right to run an efficient and effective 
workplace. Pickering involved a public school teacher who wrote a 
letter to the editor about the funding decisions of the school 
board—her ultimate supervisor. Although Pickering’s complaints did 
not directly involve his co-workers or immediate supervisors, his 
editorial letter did relate in some way to his employment, even if 
only tangentially. The Court established the balancing test to apply 
in “the enormous variety” of fact situations that might arise when it 
is important for an employer to have some power to discipline its 
employees for their expressive activities.189 The Court mentioned 
 
 186. Id. at 60. 
 187. Id. at 62. 
 188.  See supra III.B.1. 
 189. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968). 
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several possibilities, such as situations where the employee criticizes 
his direct supervisor or co-workers and undermines harmonious 
working relationships with them;190 the employee has breached 
confidences when loyalty and confidentiality are essential to the 
job;191 or the employee’s speech impedes the proper performance of 
his job duties or interferes with the general operation of the 
employer.192  
It is less obvious that the Court in Pickering meant that a 
balancing test should apply even when the employee’s speech does 
not have any obvious connection to his employment. True, Rankin 
applied the balancing test to an employee’s non-work-related 
comment about the Reagan assassination attempt, but the employee 
made that comment at the workplace. It might make some sense to 
give an employer greater authority to restrict speech at the workplace 
because there is a greater chance that such speech will disrupt or 
otherwise interfere with efficient government operations, but this 
rationale is less persuasive when off-duty speech is at issue. Some 
lower courts have recognized this possibility, but because the Court 
applied Pickering in NTEU, a case that involved off-duty, non-work-
related speech activities, most courts simply apply Pickering because 
they feel they have no choice.193 Bound by NTEU, the lower courts 
have held that the location and work-relatedness of the expressive 
activity at issue are more appropriately taken into account during the 
balancing process itself.194  
 b. Applying the Pickering balancing test in off-duty/non-work-
related cases. In applying the Pickering balancing test, courts must 
weigh the value of the employee’s speech against the government 
employer’s interest in restricting that expression. Courts have 
struggled to determine how to conduct the “value” inquiry as well as 
what to consider cognizable government interests.  
 
 190. Id. at 569–70. 
 191. Id. at 570. 
 192. Id. at 572–73. 
 193. See, e.g., Navab-Safavi v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, 650 F. Supp. 2d 40, 55–57 
(D.D.C. 2009) (noting in case involving employee’s off-duty criticisms of United States 
involvement in Iraq that “Pickering and its progeny primarily addressed government 
employees’ criticisms of their immediate supervisors or coworkers,” but going on to apply the 
balancing test in light of NTEU). 
 194. Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 175 (2d Cir. 2006); Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 
F.3d 185, 194 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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One issue dividing the lower courts is whether the “value” of the 
employee’s speech should be taken into account in the Pickering 
balancing test. Rather than decide at the outset through application 
of Connick’s public concern inquiry that the speech is not valuable 
enough to be entitled to any First Amendment protection, several 
courts have used the Pickering balancing test to take into 
consideration the value of the speech when balancing the employee’s 
interest in making the expression against the government employer’s 
interest in suppressing it, as Judge Posner suggested in Eberhardt.195 
Thus, even employee speech that arguably involves a matter of public 
concern can be given little weight in the Pickering balance if that 
speech is not considered “serious” or “portentous.”  
In Pereira v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts took the approach Judge Posner recommended when 
it applied the Pickering balancing test to a racially offensive joke an 
investigator for the Department of Social Services made while 
attending a dinner honoring retiring public officials. Although the 
parties stipulated that the employee had an “unblemished” record 
throughout her twelve years of employment at DSS, she was fired 
when the press inaccurately reported that she had made this joke 
during her prepared remarks.196 The court rejected the 
Commonwealth’s argument that the joke failed the public concern 
test and instead considered the value of the joke as part of the 
Pickering balancing test. The court concluded that the government 
interests easily outweighed any interest the employee had in making 
the joke.197 The court explained that the employee’s “motive was not 
to engage in debate, raise awareness, or press a position.”198  
Some courts have held that the employee’s motivation for 
engaging in the expressive activity at issue is relevant. As one court 
put it, “[t]he fundamental question is whether the employee is 
seeking to vindicate personal interests or bring to light a matter of 
political, social, or other concern to the community.”199 Thus, 
speech that might otherwise relate to a matter of public concern 
might fall out of that category if the speaker’s “intent” was not to 
 
 195. Pereira v. Comm’r of Soc. Servs., 733 N.E.2d 112, 120–21 (Mass. 2000); 
Eberhardt v. O’Malley, 17 F.3d 1023, 1026 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 196. Pereira, 733 N.E.2d at 116. 
 197. Id. at 120–21. 
 198. Id. at 121. 
 199. Cahill v. O’Donnell, 75 F. Supp. 2d 264, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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reveal wrongdoing but instead just to do his job, or if his speech is 
also somehow wrapped up with an interest in improving his 
particular job situation.200 Courts have also focused on the audience 
to whom the employee’s speech was directed. Focusing on the 
audience to whom the employee communicates her dissatisfaction 
puts the employee in a bind. If the employee limits her speech to the 
workplace, courts are less likely to conclude that it involves a matter 
of public concern. On the other hand, if she does communicate with 
the outside world, she runs the risk of strengthening her employer’s 
argument that the speech is unnecessarily disruptive to the 
workplace.201  
Lower courts disagree about whether off-duty speech that 
involves a matter of public concern should be given more weight in 
the Pickering balance. The Second Circuit has suggested it should, 
holding that “[t]he more speech touches on matters of public 
concern, the greater the level of disruption the government must 
show.”202 Other courts have held that the Pickering test asks what 
the plaintiff’s interest was in making the challenged expression, not 
in the value of that expression.203 These courts have argued that off-
duty public employee speech is entitled to the same protection given 
to comparable speech made by non-employees, which includes the 
right to “free, uncensored artistic expression—even on matters 
trivial, vulgar, or profane.”204  
 c. Weighing the government’s interest. In Rankin, the Court said 
that relevant government interests include “whether the statement 
impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a 
detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal 
loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of 
the speaker’s duties or interferes with the regular operation of the 
enterprise.”205 The Court has held that these harms need not have 
actually occurred. Rather, lower courts typically follow the Court’s 
direction to give deference to government employer determinations 
 
 200. For a discussion of this issue with case examples, see Ma, supra note 11, at 132–34. 
 201. See Massaro, supra note 11, at 23–24. 
 202. Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 197 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 203. Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1565 (10th Cir. 1989); Berger v. Battaglia, 
779 F.2d 992, 999–1000 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 204. Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1565; Berger, 779 F.2d at 1000. 
 205. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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concerning the harm of its employee’s speech and the risk of 
disruption.206  
Lower courts have also disagreed whether any actual or expected 
external disruption resulting from an offended public can play a role 
in the Pickering balancing. Some courts have held that only actual or 
potential disruption of internal operations could outweigh an 
employee’s right to engage in otherwise protected expressive 
activities.207 These courts contend that relying on the public’s 
reaction to an employee’s speech is equivalent to permitting a 
“heckler’s veto,” which the Supreme Court has rejected as a 
constitutional basis for restricting protected expression.208  
Other courts have recognized that although allowing the 
majority to silence an unpopular minority through a heckler’s veto is 
unconstitutional, at times public reaction is a legitimate government 
interest. For example, the Second Circuit has held that allowing the 
government to cite parental outrage about a teacher’s membership in 
NAMBLA did not constitute an impermissible heckler’s veto because 
this reaction was more properly considered an internal disruption: 
“Parents are not outsiders seeking to heckle Melzer into silence, 
rather they are participants in public education, without whose 
cooperation public education as a practical matter cannot 
function.”209 Some courts have tried to dodge the heckler’s veto 
issue by holding that the requisite disruption is shown not by the 
public reaction itself, but rather the internal disruption caused in the 
government workplace when it has to divert its resources to respond 
to that adverse public reaction.210  
Many courts have also rejected First Amendment claims by police 
and fire employees who had engaged in hate speech off duty on the 
grounds that the speech undermined the public trust. The Second 
 
 206. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994). But see United States v. Wilcox, 66 
M.J. 442, 449–52 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (reversing conviction of member of military who attended 
KKK rally and advocated and encouraged participation in extremist organizations online using 
the identifier “US Army Paratrooper” because military had failed to show actual or potential 
adverse impact on good order and discipline in the armed services or that his racist views 
adversely affected his job performance).  
 207. Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1566–67; Berger, 779 F.2d at 1000–01. 
 208. Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1566–67; Berger, 779 F.2d at 1001. 
 209. Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 199 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 210. See, e.g., Easton v. Harsha, 505 F. Supp. 2d 948, 969–70 (D. Kan. 2007) 
(recognizing actual disruption to the internal functioning of a police department caused by 
having to respond to public criticism of employee’s blog posts). 
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Circuit has explained that public racist speech poses a “reasonable 
threat of disruption in the context of the jobs of police officers and 
firefighters,”211 and that “[t]he First Amendment does not require a 
Government employer to sit idly by while its employees insult those 
they are hired to serve and protect.”212 In the context of the police 
department, for example, courts contend that when their employees 
engage in racist and other offensive speech off the job, “respect for 
law enforcement is eroded and the ability of the police to do its work 
in that community is impaired.”213 Similar rationale has been used in 
cases involving other government officers that routinely interact with 
the public, such as social service workers.214 
When now-Justice Sotomayor was sitting on the Second Circuit, 
she dissented in a case involving an employee of the New York City 
Police Department who anonymously sent racist material in the mail 
to various nonprofit organizations that had solicited him for 
donations.215 The majority rejected the employee’s First Amendment 
claims on the ground that his actions undermined the mission of the 
NYPD and threatened to promote racial strife among the officers.216 
The employee was a computer operator who did not hold a high-
level position, or have policy-making authority or contact with the 
public.217 Sotomayor argued that it was essential to consider not just 
the mission of the government agency at stake, but also the 
relationship of the disciplined employee to that mission.218 
Sotomayor argued that it was significant that “Pappas engaged in the 
 
 211. Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 178 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Karins v. City of Atl. 
City, 706 A.2d 706, 715–16 (N.J. 1988) (rejecting First Amendment claim based on 
firefighter’s racial slur to police officer; court noted that “bigotry in a fire department can 
endanger lives,” and that racial tensions between firefighters and police officers were dangerous 
because an “almost symbiotic relationship” exists between the police and fire departments). 
 212. Locurto, 447 F.3d at 183.  
 213. Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Easton, 505 F. Supp. 
2d at 970–71.  
 214. See also Pereira v. Comm’r of Soc. Servs., 733 N.E.2d 112, 121–22 (Mass. 2000) 
(upholding dismissal of investigator for Department of Social Services for making racially 
offensive joke at a testimonial dinner because DSS was not required to take the risk that its 
investigators would be regarded as biased and unfair, and at the very least, the joke illustrated 
that the employee had poor judgment that is “inconsistent with the task often fraught with 
difficulties that investigators face every day”). 
 215. Pappas, 290 F.3d at 154–59 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 216. Id. at 147 (majority opinion). 
 217.  Id. at 148; id at 158 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 218. Pappas, 290 F.3d at 156 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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speech anonymously, on his own time, and through mailings sent 
from his home.”219 These factors are important, she explained, for 
several reasons. First, because he did not identify himself as a 
member of the police force, and because he was a low-level employee 
with no public contact, no one would think his views represented the 
NYPD—as they might if he were the Police Commissioner.220 
Although Sotomayor recognized that the employee was eventually 
unmasked and that the resulting bad publicity threatened to 
undermine NYPD’s relationship with the community, she noted that 
in this case the NYPD itself had unmasked its employee and created 
the bad publicity by publicizing his activities.221 Because the 
employee engaged in this admittedly offensive speech in private and 
on his own time as a “private citizen,” Sotomayor concluded that the 
Pickering balancing tilted strongly in his favor.222  
IV. SUGGESTED APPROACH 
This Article argues that the Court should reconsider its approach 
to the off-duty expressive activities of government employees, 
particularly when they are not work-related. First, the Court should 
abandon a threshold public concern requirement in such cases. 
When an employee engages in speech outside of work on topics that 
are not directly related to work, the government employer’s interest 
in restricting that speech is low. The public concern inquiry 
inappropriately gives employers almost complete control over their 
employees’ private discourse. Because this suggested approach turns 
on whether speech is in fact work-related, a more robust discussion 
of the definition of “work-related” is essential. This Article argues 
that expressive activities should be considered work-related only 
when they criticize the workplace where the employee works, 
including criticism of her co-workers or supervisors.  
This Article also argues that the Court should also reconsider the 
application of the Pickering test in cases involving off-duty, non-
work-related expressive activities. Rather than subjecting this speech 
to the vagaries of a balancing test, the Court should conclude that 
such speech is presumptively entitled to strong First Amendment 
 
 219. Id. at 157. 
 220. Id. at 157–58. 
 221. Id. at 159.  
 222. Id. at 158. 
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protection that can be overcome only in two limited circumstances. 
The first is when the government can demonstrate that the 
employee’s expressive activities reveal that the employee is unfit to 
perform his duties. The second, informed by the government speech 
doctrine, is when the employee holds such a significant leadership 
position within the organization that it is reasonable for the public to 
associate the views of that employee with the agency, and the speech 
actually disrupts or threatens to disrupt the proper functioning of the 
agency.  
A. Abandon the Public Concern Requirement in Cases Involving Non-
Work-Related Expressive Activities 
The Court should abandon the public concern inquiry in off-
duty cases involving expressive activities that are not directly related 
to the employee’s work. As Justice O’Connor argued in her 
concurring opinion in NTEU, Connick’s “public concern” inquiry 
has no place as applied to “off-hour speech bearing no nexus to 
Government employment-speech that by definition does not relate 
to ‘internal office affairs’ or the employee’s status as an employee.”223 
1. Narrow definition of “work-related” 
The first step is for the Court to narrow its definition of what it 
means for speech to be work-related. The definition of “work-
related” is important because it serves as a threshold inquiry to the 
two tracks of constitutional analysis the Court has suggested for off-
duty expression. If speech is not “work-related,” then a public 
employer faces a much higher burden to overcome its employee’s 
First Amendment rights. If the speech is work-related, in contrast, 
the employee can succeed only if he can survive the 
Pickering/Connick framework, a daunting task.  
The Court has been inconsistent about what it means for 
expressive activities to be work-related. In Pickering, a school teacher 
criticized his school district’s school board in a letter to the editor, in 
which he did not conceal his identity. The subject matter of his 
expression directly concerned his workplace writ large—the school 
system—but not his immediate supervisors, co-workers, or job 
duties. Nevertheless, the Court declared that his expression was 
 
 223. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 480 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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“only tangentially and insubstantially” related to his public 
employment.224  
In contrast, in Roe, the Court held that the fact that a police 
officer indirectly referred to his employment in the context of selling 
sexually explicit videos was sufficient to make his expression work-
related. In that case, the officer’s speech did not concern his 
supervisors, his co-workers, or the subject matter of his work. There 
was no indication that consumers of Roe’s sexually explicit tapes 
knew his identity; he did not wear his uniform in the videos, nor did 
he identify himself in those videos as an officer. Following this 
expansive view of “work related,” the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
another officer’s sexually explicit website was also “work related” 
even though he had done nothing to tie the website to his 
employment, noting that “it can be seriously asked whether a police 
officer can ever disassociate himself from his powerful public position 
sufficiently to make his speech (and other activities) entirely 
unrelated to that position in the eyes of the public and his 
superiors.”225  
Interpreting “work related” in the broad manner Roe suggests 
threatens to swallow all of the expressive activities of public 
employees, at least as soon as the public at large learns the identity of 
the speaker, and places employees in perpetual danger of losing their 
jobs for anything they say, even outside of the workplace. The Court 
should back away from a broad definition of work related that 
encompasses any speech that refers to the employee’s status as a 
government employee. Instead, the Court should return to a 
common-sense notion of “work-related” that restricts that category 
to speech that itself directly refers to the employee’s workplace, 
supervisors, or co-workers. Any concerns about how the speech may 
reflect on the employee’s ability to do his job or how the speech may 
interfere with the work of the government employer can be taken 
into account in other ways. Under this approach, the speech at issue 
in Pickering—a teacher’s criticism of the school board’s funding 
decisions—would represent the outer edge of what constitutes work-
related expression. 
 
 224. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968). 
 225. Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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2. Abandon public concern requirement in non-work-related cases  
In Connick, the Court made it clear that its imposition of a 
public concern requirement was an attempt to carve out a small but 
important subset of work-related expression from First Amendment 
protection as a way of reducing litigation. In that case, the 
employee’s speech concerned specific details about her workplace; 
there could be no doubt that her expression was work related, and 
the Court established a public concern test because it was particularly 
concerned about opening up the floodgates to First Amendment 
litigation involving work-related speech. While it may have been 
appropriate for the Court to establish this sort of threshold 
requirement for work-related expression—although there are good 
reasons to believe that even in that context the test is misplaced—it is 
clear that this threshold inquiry question is not appropriate for cases 
involving expression that does not directly involve work.226  
As discussed in Section III.A, there are many fundamental 
problems with a public concern inquiry in any context. In addition 
to the lack of clear guidance from the Court regarding how this 
inquiry should be conducted, perhaps the greatest problem is the 
“squishiness” of the inquiry that permits courts to make explicit ad 
hoc value judgments about expression.227 Applying the public 
concern inquiry in off-duty cases has been particularly difficult. 
Courts have especially struggled to figure out how to conduct a 
public concern inquiry in cases involving expressive associations and 
in cases involving hate speech. For example, in Pappas v. Giuliani, all 
three judges sitting on the Second Circuit panel had different views 
about whether hate speech sent anonymously in the mail constituted 
a matter of public concern. One judge dodged the issue, another 
said it was clearly not a matter of public concern, and still a third 
(then-Judge Sotomayor) said that it was just as obvious that it was a 
matter of public concern.228 In the case of Andrew Shirvell, anti-gay 
 
 226. Some lower courts have noted this problem. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 
1557, 1563–64 (10th Cir. 1989); Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 997 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 227. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 164 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing 
against public concern standard, noting that in the defamation context the Court had rejected 
that approach in favor of focusing on the status of the plaintiff) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974))).  
 228. This same issue has been raised in Synder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), 
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010), where the Court must determine whether hate speech 
directed at a particular individual involves a matter of public concern entitled to greater First 
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comments may, to some, seem to fall outside of the category of 
public concern, but given that they were made in the context of 
criticizing an elected student leader, they are arguably a matter of 
public concern. 
Similarly, it is not obvious whether the type of sexually explicit 
material at issue in Dible and Roe is a matter of public concern. As 
distasteful as the expression might be, it clearly does have some 
expressive value, and it was disseminated to a public audience. Just as 
the Supreme Court has held—in other contexts—that artistic and 
entertaining speech is entitled to full First Amendment protection 
even if it lacks a political message, protection for the cop’s strip tease 
in Roe should not turn on whether he can convince a court that he 
was using this form of expression to make some sort of political 
comment on sexuality and power in our society.  
Even if we could establish a workable definition of what 
constitutes a matter of public concern, it still would not make sense 
to place the rights of government employees to engage in private 
expression at the whim of their government employers. When 
considering the employee’s interests at stake, it is necessary to 
consider not merely his interest in contributing to the public debate, 
or even society’s interest in hearing what he has to say, but also in his 
interest in autonomy and freedom from governmental interference in 
matters pertaining to his personal life.229 The Court’s decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas underscores the need to give protection to public 
employee speech on private matters. As Paul Seconda has pointed 
out, “Lawrence attaches some form of heightened review when the 
government seeks to interfere with the private and personal lives of 
individuals.”230  
The public concern requirement is overbroad because it operates 
to strip First Amendment protection from speech that does not 
necessarily interfere in any way with the operation and management 
of the government agency.231 This problem appears particularly likely 
 
Amendment protection. The Court heard oral argument in this case in October 2010; a 
decision is expected by June 2011. 
 229. Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence: The 
Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to Decisional Non-Interference in Private 
Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 123 (2006). 
 230. Id. at 117. 
 231. For a more thorough discussion of the vagueness and overbreadth concerns Connick 
created, see Rosenthal, supra note 146, at 557–67. 
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when the speech at issue does not directly involve the workplace. A 
public concern requirement therefore is not appropriately tied to the 
underlying theory of why we would permit a government employer 
to restrict the speech of its employees, especially when that speech is 
not directly related to the workplace.232 
Although the focus of this Article is on off-duty expression, the 
Court should abandon a public concern inquiry for all non-work-
related expression, whether it takes place at work or off-duty. Public 
employees have private conversations at work on both public and 
private issues, and the government’s interest in preventing or 
punishing these sorts of conversations typically has very little to do 
with the subject matter of the comment and more to do with 
whether the comment interferes with the employee’s work. 
Employees spend too much of their lives at work to be expected to 
limit all their expression at work to work-related topics, and as the 
facts of Rankin illustrate, in many cases the employer has little 
legitimate reason to restrict most of what its employees say at work 
that is not directly work related.  
One reason to address the applicability of a public concern 
requirement to all non-work-related expression is that any legal 
regime that turned on whether the employee was on- or off-duty 
could be difficult to apply in some cases. In the age of the Internet 
and other electronic technologies, it is more common than ever 
before for employees to engage in non-work-related expression while 
they are technically on the job. Indeed, Andrew Shirvell was 
ultimately terminated in part because his employer discovered that he 
was using his work computer to blog and his work telephone to call 
Nancy Pelosi’s office, where the student leader was interning, to 
insist that the student be fired. As people spend a greater proportion 
of their waking hours at work, the opportunity for self-expression 
outside of the workplace diminishes. Furthermore, as greater 
numbers of employees telecommute from home, the line between 
workplace and home diminishes. With the pervasive use of electronic 
technology, like cell phones and the Internet, employees often 
perform work-related functions while they are not at work. As the 
next subsection will discuss, in many cases government employers 
will still be able to defeat their employee’s First Amendment claims 
without having to rely on a threshold public concern test.  
 
 232. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573–74 (1968). 
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 The ambition of this Article is modest, and as a result it does not 
take a position on whether the public concern inquiry should be 
abandoned in all employee speech cases. Given all the difficulties 
inherent in a public concern inquiry, and the ability of the Pickering 
balancing test to account for the value of the employee’s speech, that 
might be a good idea, and many commentators have made that very 
suggestion. Regardless of the merits of that broader argument, 
however, the need to abandon a public concern test in non-work-
related, off-duty cases is especially compelling. When speech is not 
work related, Connick’s concern about constitutionalizing all 
employee grievances is not present. Furthermore, in that context 
there is no good reason to accept as a general rule that the 
government employer’s interests always trump its employee’s interest 
in engaging in off-duty, non-work-related expression unless it is a 
matter of public concern.  
B. Presumptive Protection for Off-Duty, Non-Work-Related Expressive 
Activities and Limited Government Defenses 
Courts should not apply the Pickering balancing test to evaluate 
the First Amendment rights of public employees to engage in off-
duty, non-work-related expressive activities. Such a test is inherently 
subjective, lacks uniformity, and as a practical matter, offers little 
protection to government employees. Instead, assuming that the 
employee’s speech does not fall within a category of unprotected 
expression, off-duty, non-work-related speech should be 
presumptively protected and can lose this protection only if the 
government employer can show one of two things. The first is that 
the speech reveals that the employee is unfit to perform his duties. 
The second is that the employee holds a leadership position within 
the organization that makes it reasonable for the public to conclude 
that the employee’s views represent those of the government. The 
latter exception would apply in a very narrow group of cases.  
1. Reject Pickering test in favor of presumption 
When evaluating whether the expressive activities of a 
government employee are entitled to First Amendment protection, 
courts should not apply the Pickering balancing test. Instead, courts 
should presume that such speech activities are protected, provided 
they do not fall into a category of unprotected expression, and 
permit the government employer to overcome this presumption only 
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in those limited circumstances when the government’s interest so 
warrants.  
The biggest problem with applying the Pickering balancing test 
to the off-duty, non-work-related expressive activities of government 
employees is that it offers too little protection to that speech. Often 
these cases involve speech that lies at the fringes of the First 
Amendment, such as hate speech and sexually explicit expression, or 
speech that is otherwise regarded as offensive. As a result, courts all 
too often conclude that the employee’s expression has such limited 
value that it is easily outweighed by whatever interests the employer 
asserts. In conducting the balancing, courts do not consider how 
government control of its employees’ off-duty expressive activities 
can have broader societal impact by resulting in a significant chilling 
effect on the speech of a huge number of citizens and on the 
marketplace of ideas generally.233 Indeed, the Pickering balancing 
test is designed to focus more narrowly on the facts of the particular 
case.  
Another problem with the Pickering balancing test as most 
courts have applied it is that it permits adverse public reaction to the 
expressive activities to be considered on the government’s side of the 
balance. As a result, it theoretically matters very little what an 
employee says. If there is a public reaction, then the employee will 
likely lose constitutional protection for his speech. If the public never 
learns about the employee’s speech, or for whatever reason does not 
react strongly to the employee’s speech, then the employee has a 
stronger chance of winning his case.234 Relatedly, given that the 
Pickering balancing test gives substantial deference to the 
government employer’s predictions of disruption, there is a great 
chance in any given case that an employee is punished not because 
his speech actually caused or threatened disruption, but, as Justice 
Marshall noted in Rankin, “simply because superiors disagree with 
the content” of the expression.235 
Rejecting the Pickering balancing test in favor of presumptive 
protection for the off-duty, non-work-related expressive activities of 
government employees recognizes the inherent difficulties of 
 
 233. For an excellent discussion of the serious problems inherent in balancing tests, see 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987). 
 234. For a lengthier discussion of this problem, see Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing 
Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1021 (2005). 
 235. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987). 
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applying a balancing test to such speech. This is not a presumption 
that is insurmountable, but it serves simply to give an employee’s 
expressive activities a fighting chance against government 
suppression. 
2. Overcoming the presumption 
Although this Article contends that the off-duty, non-work-
related expressive activities of government employees should be 
given robust First Amendment protection, it recognizes that it is 
essential to give government employers the ability to overcome this 
protection in appropriate circumstances. Government employers 
should be permitted to overcome the presumptive protection for its 
employees’ speech activities when it can demonstrate either that (1) 
the speech demonstrates that the employee is unfit to perform his 
work duties, or (2) the public reasonably believes that the 
government employee speaks for the government enterprise, and the 
message of that employee undermines the proper functioning of that 
agency. 
 a. Unfit to perform work duties. Although an employee’s off-duty, 
non-work-related speech should be entitled to a strong presumption 
of constitutional protection, the government employer must be 
given the authority to suppress or punish that speech when the 
speech reveals that the employee is unfit to perform his job duties. 
By focusing on the employee’s ability to perform his job, this 
approach avoids the dangerous and easily abused inquiry into 
whether the speech is inconsistent with the overall mission of the 
government enterprise.  
This approach requires the government to demonstrate that the 
employee cannot perform his own job, not that his speech 
undermines the mission of the government agency as a whole. This 
defense would necessarily be very fact- and context-specific. The 
position and responsibilities of the employee would be of paramount 
importance in determining whether the expressive activities indicate 
unfitness. Jobs that require the exercise of discretion or public trust 
demand a higher standard of conduct from those who hold them. 
Thus, it is unlikely that the NYPD could demonstrate that racial bias 
rendered the computer operator in Pappas unfit to do his job given 
that there was no showing that he interacted with the public in any 
way or that his job required the exercise of discretion. The majority 
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in that case emphasized that at any moment Pappas could become a 
beat officer; however, the officer was not in fact a beat officer when 
he was terminated, and under the approach this Article proposes, 
there is no reason why the NYPD should not be able to take his off-
duty expressive activities into account before promoting him to such 
a position. In addition, this defense would not be of much help in 
cases involving sexually explicit speech, such as that of the cops in 
Roe and Dible. Vague assertions that the officers’ sexually explicit 
activities undermined the “professionalism” of the office would be 
insufficient; instead, their employers would have to demonstrate that 
the activities undermined their ability to do their jobs. It is hard to 
see how such activities would have that effect. 
Notably, the government’s ability to succeed on this defense 
would have nothing to do with the public’s reaction to the 
employee’s expressive activities, thus avoiding the risk of a heckler’s 
veto.236 Thus, it would not matter that the parents in Meltzer were 
up in arms and threatened to withdraw their children from school. It 
should not be up to the community to determine whether the 
employee is fit to perform his job; otherwise, First Amendment 
freedoms would hang by a very slender thread. It is not hard to 
imagine parents getting upset if a teacher created sexually explicit 
videos like those at issue in Roe, but assuming the teacher did not 
share them with his students, it is not clear that such conduct reveals 
unfitness for teaching. Instead, under the unfitness standard this 
Article proposes, the school district would have to demonstrate that 
a teacher’s association with NAMBLA renders him unfit to teach 
high school students. Although in that case there was no evidence 
that the teacher had ever abused his students or other minors, the 
school would have a strong argument that his active membership in 
an organization that advocates for such relationships indicates 
unfitness for a position where it is essential that he can be trusted 
with minors. 
An unfitness defense might also come into play in cases involving 
non-work-related expression that happens at work. When an 
employee engages in non-work-related expression while performing 
his job duties at work, the government employer should generally be 
given more power to restrict that speech on the grounds that the 
 
 236. It would also avoid the risk that a public employee’s speech rights would depend on 
whether the public learns about his expressive activities.  
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employee is unable to do his job effectively. For example, if the clerk 
at the Department of Motor Vehicles has a proclivity for lecturing 
customers about his view of political affairs, the employer should be 
given more leeway to restrict that expressive activity, even though it 
relates to a matter of obvious public concern.  
In evaluating a government employer’s assurance that its 
employee’s off-duty speech indicates unfitness for office, courts 
should take care to take into account the precise form, content, and 
context of the speech. Random or isolated comments made privately 
should rarely be sufficient to indicate unfitness. For example, it is not 
clear that an isolated off-color joke like that at issue in Pereira would 
be sufficient to demonstrate that a social worker is unfit to perform 
her job, any more than the off-handed remark about the Reagan 
assassination attempt in Rankin indicated that the employee was ill-
suited for law enforcement work. If an employee has been working 
for the government agency for some time, the government should be 
required to present evidence that the alleged character trait has 
revealed itself in the employee’s work.237 The government should not 
serve as the political-correctness police and punish their employees 
any time the employees engage in expressive activities that are 
outside of the mainstream. As one judge has argued, if courts are 
quick to accept the unfitness defense, “[t]he State, in short, with 
impunity, could not only chill, but control, the speech of a 
significant number of citizens, who work for State government, 
simply because they work for State government.”238  
It is not clear that the unfitness defense would help the Michigan 
Attorney General’s office justify its termination of Andrew Shirvell. 
In his initial comments defending his decision to keep Shirvell on the 
job, Attorney General Cox emphasized that Shirvell was just a low-
level, line attorney who worked on appellate matters. It is not clear 
what sort of discretion was involved in his daily activities or what sort 
of contact he had with the public, if any. Without knowing more 
about Shirvell’s job responsibilities, it is difficult to know whether his 
anti-homosexual views would impede his ability to do his job. The 
Michigan Attorney General’s office should be required to show 
 
 237. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 602 A.2d 712, 721 (Md. 
1992) (Bell, J., dissenting) (arguing that a prison guard’s First Amendment rights were 
violated when he was terminated for offensive remarks he made to a bank teller while 
attempting to cash a check off-duty). 
 238. Id. at 727. 
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specifically how his bias has played out or threatens to play out in the 
kinds of cases that he handles. 
The point of my argument is that courts should not immediately 
accept the government’s vague assertion that its employee’s offensive 
or unpopular speech reveals unfitness for his job duties without a 
more searching analysis that considers both the content of the 
expression and the precise duties of the employee. Membership in 
NAMBLA probably does not indicate unfitness to be a prosecutor 
(unless the prosecutor is responsible for litigating child abuse cases) 
but does indicate unfitness to be a school teacher. Participation in 
explicit sexual videos does not indicate unfitness to serve as a police 
officer (unless those videos contain violence), but may indicate 
unfitness to serve on a government commission against pornography.  
This sort of fact-specific inquiry protects the government’s legitimate 
interests in performing its functions efficiently and effectively without 
sacrificing the expressive rights of its employees unnecessarily.  
Notably, General Cox does not appear to be resting his decision 
to terminate Shirvell solely on concerns that his anti-gay attacks 
indicated that he could not perform his job, but rather the ground 
that he misused his work computer and telephone to engage in these 
attacks.239 Although government employers, like private employers, 
should have the right to control the use of their own equipment, 
relying on this defense to defeat Shirvell’s First Amendment claim is 
problematic. Employees frequently use their work telephones and 
emails for personal use while they are on break. Although Shirvell 
may technically have used state resources to wage his attack, it is not 
clear from publicly available information whether Shirvell used his 
work email account or invoked his position as an assistant attorney 
general to engage in his criticisms of the student body president.240 
Furthermore, it is unrealistic to expect that public employees will 
spend every moment they are at work engaged in work-related 
activities. At the very least, courts should pause before concluding 
that government employers have absolute power to discipline their 
 
 239.  See David Jesse, Andrew Shirvell fired from job at Michigan Attorney General's 
Office, ANNARBOR.COM (Nov. 8, 2010, 2:46 PM) http://www.annarbor.com/news/andrew-
shirvell-fired-from-job-at-attorney-generals-office/. In announcing Shirvell’s termination, 
General Cox stated that although he still believes employees have First Amendment rights, 
Shirvell was terminated for misusing state resources, engaging in borderline stalking behavior, 
and for lying to investigators during his disciplinary hearing. Id.  
 240.  If he had, the Attorney General’s Office would have a much stronger argument that 
Shirvell had misused his authority and misrepresented the views of the AG’s office. 
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employees whenever they use government equipment for non-work-
related speech.241  
 b. Interference with government speech. A second possible defense 
in cases involving a public employee’s off-duty, non-work-related 
expression involves a permutation of the government speech doctrine 
the Court invoked in Garcetti. When it is reasonable for the public 
to associate the expressive activities of a government employee with 
his employer, and that speech is inconsistent with the clearly 
articulated mission of the employer, the employee’s First 
Amendment rights must yield. This defense draws loosely upon the 
government speech doctrine.  
It is difficult to apply the government speech doctrine in a 
straightforward manner in cases involving non-work-related 
expressive activities. Whereas in Garcetti the majority suggested that 
the government speech doctrine had traction in cases involving any 
speech an employee might make pursuant to his job duties, it is 
impossible to justify restrictions on off-duty, non-work-related 
expression on the grounds that it is speech that the government has 
bought and paid for.  
That does not mean, however, that the government speech 
doctrine is not relevant in off-duty, non-work-related cases. The 
Court has suggested in some of its freedom of association cases that 
it is important to require a group to accept a member whose 
viewpoints are at odds with those of the organization as a whole 
because it would essentially force the group to engage in compelled 
speech. Thus, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Supreme Court 
held that forcing the Boy Scouts of America to admit a gay 
scoutmaster in order to comply with a state anti-discrimination law 
“would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, 
both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts 
accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”242 
The Court majority relied heavily on its prior decision in Hurley v. 
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, which held that the 
 
 241. The Supreme Court recently noted the difficulties of resolving cases involving 
government-issued electronic devices. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629–30 
(2010) (in a case involving an employee’s communications on government-issued pager, the 
Court declined to issue a “broad holding concerning employees’ privacy expectations vis-à-vis 
employer-provided technological equipment” citing concerns that technology and community 
and workplace norms were constantly changing). 
 242. 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000). 
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First Amendment protected the right of the organizers of a private 
St. Patrick’s Day Parade to exclude an Irish-American gay, lesbian, 
and bi-sexual group that wanted to march behind their own 
banner.243 In Hurley, a unanimous Court concluded that requiring 
the private group to admit the GLIB group would interfere with a 
speaker’s “autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”244 
The Court held that including the GLIB group in the parade, 
marching behind their own banner, would send the message that 
people of their sexual orientation have as much of a right to 
unqualified social acceptance as heterosexuals, and the private group 
had every right to keep that message out of their own parade.245 
There are several problems with extending the rationale of Dale 
and Hurley to the context of government employment, not the least 
of which is that a government agency is not an expressive 
organization.246 But even putting that major obstacle to one side, the 
sheer number of government employees would make it unreasonable 
for a citizen to assume that the off-duty speech of any one of them 
represents the views of the employer. As Justice Stevens noted in his 
Dale dissent with respect to the Boy Scouts, which has admitted over 
87 million young Americans into its ranks during its existence: “The 
notion that an organization of that size and enormous prestige 
implicitly endorses the views that each of those adults may express in 
a non-Scouting context is simply mind boggling.”247 The same must 
certainly be true, if not more so, for governmental agencies that are 
bound by the First Amendment. Just as a reasonable person should 
not view all speech in the public square as expressing a government-
endorsed message, neither is all off-duty speech of a government 
employee.  
While it might not make sense to permit a government employer 
to claim that all of its employees’ off-duty expressive activities reflect 
on the government agency in some way, there may be some cases 
where it might be reasonable for the public to associate an 
 
 243. 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995). 
 244. Id. at 573. 
 245. Id. at 574–75. 
 246. For an excellent criticism of the assumption that government employers are 
expressive associations with First Amendment rights to disassociate itself from any message it 
deems antithetical, see Paul M. Secunda, The Solomon Amendment, Expressive Associations, and 
Public Employment, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1767 (2007). 
 247. 530 U.S. at 697 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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employee’s off-duty expressive activities with his employer. In a 
separate dissenting opinion in Dale, Justice Souter argued that “[i]t 
is certainly possible for an individual to become so identified with a 
position as to epitomize it publicly,” particularly if that person is in a 
leadership position.248  
It might also be reasonable for the public to associate the off-
duty speech of a government employee with the government agency 
that employs him in cases where the employee uses his government 
position to communicate his message. In a footnote in Rankin, the 
Court made clear that it did not mean to suggest that low-level 
employees were immune from discharge on account of their 
expressive activities. The Court cited approvingly a case from a 
federal appellate court that upheld the discharge of a clerical 
employee who stated on television news that he was an employee of 
the sheriff’s office and a member of the KKK.249 Similarly, a 
reasonable person might think that an employee is speaking as an 
employee if he uses his work email account or office letterhead to 
communicate.250 It is not reasonable, however, to assume an 
employee speaks for his government agency whenever his private 
communications are made public. If an employee engages in 
anonymous speech, as in Pappas, it is not reasonable for the public to 
associate that employee’s speech with his employer even when he is 
unmasked. Similarly, in Roe, the fact that the stripping officer used a 
generic police uniform in his videos is not a sufficient basis for a 
reasonable person to connect Roe’s activities with the San Diego 
Police Department.  
Even if the government can show that the public reasonably 
associates the employee’s speech with his employer, the government 
must also demonstrate that the speech is inconsistent with a clearly 
(and previously) articulated message that is essential to its mission. 
Because government enterprises are not expressive associations, there 
is no reason to defer to their assertions of what viewpoints are 
essential to their mission, as the Court did with the Boy Scouts in 
 
 248. Id. at 702 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter explained he voted to reject the 
BSA’s claim because it had failed “to make sexual orientation the subject of any unequivocal 
advocacy, using the channels it customarily employs to state its message.” Id. at 701. 
 249. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 391 n.18 (1987) (citing McMullen v. Carson, 
754 F.2d 936 (11th Cir. 1985)). 
 250. This is not the same as simply using a work computer or other electronic device to 
communicate. One does not have to use a work email account to send an email from work. 
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Dale. Requiring that the government agency clearly articulate before 
litigation what viewpoints are essential to its mission both provides 
notice to the employees of what speech will not be tolerated and also 
limits the ability of the government to discipline employees for 
speech it simply does not like. Thus, in Roe, even if a reasonable 
person could connect the stripping officer to the San Diego Police 
Department, it is unclear how his activities were inconsistent with 
the mission of that agency.  
In considering whether the speech of public employees interferes 
with the ability of their government employers to communicate a 
particular message, it is also important for courts to consider the 
ability of the government employer to engage in effective 
counterspeech.251 Such counterspeech can serve to distance the 
government employer from its employee’s speech. Indeed, Pickering 
itself found it relevant that the school board could easily use 
counterspeech measures to rebut any inaccuracy in Pickering’s 
budget figures.252 The statement issued by Michigan Attorney 
General Mike Cox early on in the Shirvell scandal is this sort of 
counterspeech that reminds the public that government employees 
retain their First Amendment rights to say what they please when 
they are not at work, and that his views did not represent the views 
of the Michigan Attorney General’s office. Of course, counterspeech 
may not always be effective in cases where it is not possible for the 
public to “disassociate” the employee’s speech from his government 
employer. Typically this will occur in cases involving high level, 
supervisory employees. 
The government speech defense may, in some cases, give 
government employers greater authority to restrict the speech of 
their employees while they are at work. After all, there is a much 
greater likelihood that the expression of a government employee at 
work will be reasonably regarded as representing the views of the 
government, particularly when it is made to the public in the course 
of performing work-related duties. Thus, when a government 
employee speaks to a customer at a government office, a customer 
might reasonably believe that the employee represents the views of 
the government because the employee is serving as the “public face” 
 
 251. Smith, supra note 11, at 273. 
 252. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968). 
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of the government agency. In addition, government counterspeech is 
likely to be ineffective in such circumstances.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this Article is not to suggest that the Court must 
entirely revamp its jurisprudence regarding public employee 
expressive rights, although that would probably not be a bad idea. 
Instead, it has an admittedly myopic focus on First Amendment 
claims brought by public employees who have been disciplined as a 
result of their non-work-related expressive activities that take place 
outside of the workplace.  
It is tempting to give government employers wide berth to 
restrict the expressive activities of their employees given that most of 
the cases involve highly offensive speech. It is worth noting, 
however, that granting government employers this authority would 
authorize the punishment of employee speech simply because 
contrary to the views of the supervising government official. For 
example, lower courts have seen cases involve anti-gay speech as well 
as pro-gay rights speech. In addition, if employees do not have 
robust protection for their off-duty speech, it is hard to see how they 
would be entitled to robust protection for their private off-duty 
conduct. Thus, an employer could fire an employee for any conduct 
that the government employee believes is contrary to the 
government’s mission, including intimate (and constitutionality 
protected) decisions regarding sexuality, marriage, cohabitation, and 
abortion. Permitting public employees to invoke the First 
Amendment to protect speech that we abhor also permits others to 
invoke it to protect speech that we think is worth protecting. 
 
